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I. INTRODUCTION

During his two terms as President of Russia, did Vladimir Putin further the
net development of a legal culture in Russia? The term 'legal culture' is meant
here to include not only the statutory changes and positivist legal reforms that
President Putin advanced or retarded, but also to assess how his administration
affected the development of the rule of law in Russia over the course of the last
eight years. On May 7, 2008, Mr. Putin heard his successor Dmitrii Medvedev
take the oath of office in the Grand Kremlin Palace.' It is therefore
appropriate to begin reflecting on the Putin years.2
This Article examines three legal issues that have had the greatest impact
on the development of Russia's legal culture under Vladimir Putin: (1) the
Second Chechen War; (2) Russian membership in the Council of Europe; and,
(3) renewed efforts under Putin at codification of law, as evidenced by the
creation of a new criminal procedure code. These three windows present
different views of the state of Russian law. The first is bleak, the second
hopeful, and the third ambivalent. They are closely linked and expose the deep
ambiguity and complexity ofPutin's approach to the constitutionally professed
establishment in Russia of a rule-of-law based state.
The "Putin Effect" on legal developments in Russia is worthy of
consideration for several reasons. First,as noted above Russia now claims to
be a democratic, rule-of-law state in its Constitution.3 Second, most serious
democratic theorists argue that the development of the rule of law is a sine qua
non for a modem, stable democracy, an independent variable that is at least as
' C.J. Chivers, Medvedev Takes Oath in Russia, but Putin Dominates Much ofDay, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A14. Russian names are rendered in their most common English form

to aid the majority of readers (e.g. Yeltsin, not Yel'tsin). Russian sources are provided in
Cyrillic on the assumption that interested persons who do not read Russian would require such
assistance in accessing transliterated citations to authority.
2 To be more precise, it is appropriate to begin reflecting on Putin's 2000-2008 presidency.
At the time of this publication, rumor and speculation about the future of Vladimir Putin was
rampant and rivaled the "reading-between-the-lines" skills ofthe best Soviet-era kremlinologists.
Among the most extreme examples was the assertion that Mr. Putin's decision to retain the pen
he used while in office to sign key documents (contrary to the "tradition" established when Boris
Yeltsin gave his pen to Putin at the latter's inauguration) signaled that Putin "intends to remain
Russia's principal leader." Lynn Berry, Putin Signals He Intends to Stay in Charge ofRussia,
WASH. POST, May 8, 2008.
3 KOHCTYUHA PoccHnIcKoi OeaepauHH, cTamRb 1(1) [hereinafter KOHCT. P'D], translated
in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 16 (Vladimir V. Belyakov & Walter J. Raymond
eds., 1994) ("The Russian Federation-Russia is a democratic, federal, rule-of-law state with a
republican form of government.").
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important as the evolution of civil society, a free market, and contested, multiparty elections.4 Third, to the extent that Dmitrii Medvedev is expected to
pursue similar legal reforms (either in partnership with, or under the shadow
of, his new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin), assessment of the activities of his
predecessor is useful. Fourth, should Russia unquestionably falter in its
transition from authoritarianism and fall back into an unabashedly nondemocratic regime, it will largely be the extent to which there remains respect
for rule of law that determines the shape and the duration of that new system.
This Article presents a faint-hearted endorsement of Putin's legal legacy.
The conclusions reached in this Article run against the prevailing popular
wisdom, which tends to characterize Putin's presidency as one that has
unreservedly politicized law as a tool for state control over people and
resources, much as Putin's Soviet predecessors did.5 The endorsement is
nevertheless a tepid one because Russia's new legal culture has very shallow
roots that, at the time of this writing, could easily be yanked free of Russian
soil by the very man that has been tending them with faltering attentiveness.
Part II of this Article, therefore, frames this analysis with three caveats that
should inform any retrospective look at legal reform in Russia as near-to-term
as this one. The unifying message of this cautionary troika is that, although
the standards for assessing Russian law should be high, and indicia to measure
whether the Russian government and society meets them rather inflexible,
expectations in the short run should be rather low.

' See, e.g., Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 10

(1996); Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 353, 358
(2006) (discussing democratic theorists).
' See, e.g., Editorial, Putin the Great: The Arc of his AuthoritarianRevival, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2007, at A18 ("Mr. Putin has ransacked the hopes the world once had for post-Soviet
Russian democracy. He is reviving Russian authoritarianism, and the world's democracies need
to prepare for its consequences."); Editorial, PutinTakes on the Election Observers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2007, at A24 ("It was only with luck, Benjamin Franklin mulled during the debates of
the Constitutional Convention, that the framers would 'produce a government that could
forestall, for a decade perhaps, the decline of the Republic into tyranny.' The American states
had that luck. Russia has not."); Editorial, Russia's DNA and PresidentBush's CYA, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at A20 ("Will the Russia experts also be proved wrong someday? No one
can be sure. But it would be reasonable to point out that, one decade after the fall of
communism, Russia had taken imperfect but impressive strides toward nurturing a free press, a
vibrant political scene, a government with checks and balances, and a growing civil society.
Then Mr. Putin, whose soul Mr. Bush famously vouched for, consciously chose to lead the
nation in a different direction, one that resonated with his KGB past. Mr. Bush and his foreign
policy advisers denied this trend long after it had become apparent to almost everyone else.").
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Part III examines legal issues raised, respectively, by the Second Chechen
War, Russian membership in the Council of Europe, and the reform of Russian
criminal procedure. These topics are interrelated. The Chechen War has
affected legal developments not just in the North Caucasus but throughout
Russia. The effectiveness of the Council of Europe is revealed to be at its apex
as a catalyst for the new criminal procedure code and at its nadir in its response
to Chechnya. The codification drives are evidence of the value placed on law
at the same time that the reflexive disregard of their provisions in political
cases-whether involving cases in Chechnya or elsewhere-indicates the risk
that legal codes can remain paper reforms.
Part IV concludes with a few words about the Russian presidential elections
that occurred on March 2, 2008, resulting in the election of Russia's third
president, Dmitrii Medvedev. To suggest, as this Article does, that Putin's
presidency should be viewed as a net positive factor in the development of the
rule of law, is to beg the question whether the net benefits would be greater
still if he were somehow to have retained his position. A third, consecutive
term for Putin as President, of course, would have constituted a violation of
Article 81 of the Russian Constitution.6 It would also have exposed the ruleof-law claim in Article 1 to be merely an aspirational one, if that.
II. CAVEATS & WARNINGS

A. Soviet Law, Path-Dependency,andLegal Positivism
Russia today exists with a legacy of positivist lawmaking that has both
pluses and minuses. A Soviet-era anecdote is illustrative.7 In the late 1980s,
a highly accomplished but non-practicing Soviet lawyer, Vasily Vlasihin,
arrived at JFK International Airport in New York City. When the immigration
official saw his visa, he asked rather incredulously if there really could be such
a thing as a Soviet lawyer. Upon affirmation, he replied, "Oh, how wonderful!
Welcome to the United States. But is there any law in the Soviet Union?!"
"There is," the Soviet lawyer replied, "and quite a lot of it."

6 KOHCT. PcD craTbA 81(3), translatedin CONSTITUTIONOFTHE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra

note 3, at 47 ("The same individual shall not be elected to the office of President of the Russian
Federation for more than two consecutive terms.").
7 The following anecdote is taken from Vasily A. Vlasihin, Towards a Bill of Rights for
Russia: Progressand Roadblocks, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1993).
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Quantitatively, that was a gross understatement. In the few years preceding
this then-Soviet lawyer's arrival in New York, more than 30,000 laws and substatutory acts had been enacted by the Soviet legislature and government.8 As
Bernard Rudden, formerly of Brasenose College, Oxford, put it, "[d]uring the
last years of its life the Soviet Union turned to law like a dying monarch to his
withered God . . .and the Congress and Supreme Soviet enact[ed] and
amend[ed] statutes with the fervour of one who sees in legislation the path to
paradise." 9
Qualitatively, however, the story was more complex. This mass and morass
of law could hardly have been described as forming the foundation for the rule
of law in Soviet life or governance. And even the genuine interest in legal
reform that Mikhail Gorbachev (a lawyer by training)"0 expressed in his
approach toperestroikawas not enough to radically change an institutionalized
approach to law. This approach, by deliberate design, was highly
instrumentalist and oppressive, denied basic individual liberties and due
process, and devalued legal enactments, the institutions that the enactments
created, and the personnel whose attitudes towards law these laws shaped.
November 2007 marked the ninetieth anniversary of the October
Revolution. 1 Among the first acts of the Bolsheviks after the Revolution was
the complete abolition of courts, codes, and the profession of law in all its
manifestations. 2 In place of the abolished laws, lawyers and judges, the

8

Id

9 Bernard Rudden, CivilLaw,Civil Society andthe Russian Constitution, 110 L.Q.R. 56,56
(1994).
10Gorbachev graduated from the Law Faculty at Moscow State University and was sent to
his native Stavropol' Krai to serve in the procuracy (prosecutor's office), but left after only ten
days to begin his rise in the Communist Party. ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 29,36
(1996).
" The coup d'itatthat is used by most scholars to date the "October" Revolution occurred
on October 24-25, 1917, as calculated by the Julian calendar in use in Imperial Russia at that
time. RICHARD PIPEs, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1899-1919, at 4-5 n.*, 491-92 (1990). In
the nineteenth century, it trailed the Gregorian calendar by twelve days, which meant that for the
rest of the world these revolutionary events occurred on November 6-7. Id.
12 Decree No. 1 "on the court" of November 22 (December 5), 1917 [hereinafter Decree
No. I], translatedin IDEAS AND FORCES INSOVIET LEGAL HISTORY: A READER ON THE SOVIET
STATE AND LAW 95-96 (Zigurds L. Zile, ed., 1992). The politics of the initial coalition
government between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries resulted in a slight retreat
from this stark position in February 1918 in Decree No. 2 "on the court," which relied in several
sections on the 1864 Criminal Procedure Code and partially reversed the previous decision to
dissolve the bar by instituting a College ofAdvocates. E.L. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1969). But this slight retreat did not last long. Concessions to
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proletariat was encouraged to use peBoJll10loHHblii npaBoco3HaHHe
[revoliutsionnyi pravosoznanie-"revolutionary legal consciousness"] to
decide all cases or controversies. 3 This nihilism was short-lived and followed
by periods of rigid legal positivism, stagnation, and instrumentalist
manipulation of law to serve the political and ideological interests of the
state.' 4 The largest roadblock, according to that accomplished lawyer, Vasiliy
Vlasihin, was the lack of a genuine legal culture. 5 Law is more than a set of
rules and regulations drafted and approved in compliance with procedural
standards for how a parliament conducts its business.
It is worth emphasizing this cautionary distinction between a country full
of laws-positive legislation, what could be called "law" with a lower case
"l"--and a country based on the rule of law-normative legal values that
determine what counts as "Law" with a capital "L." Many others have made
this same distinction, and I stand on the shoulders of giants to note the
enormous difference between "law" and "Law"; this is a point better made in
just about any language other than English. The French have droitand loi, the
Germans gesetz and recht, and the Russians 3aKOH [zakon] and npaBo
[pravo].16 Even ancient Romans made a distinction between lex and jus."7

imperial precedents were rescinded soon after the Bolsheviks began to rule on their own. Id.
Decree No. 3, and a special instruction issued a few days later, rejected any use of the laws and
procedural codes that sprang from the Great Reforms of Alexander II. With the exception of the
Labor and Family Codes that were quickly drafted after the Revolution, all other law during this
initial period was sporadic and ad hoc. See generally id.
3 Article 5 of Decree No. 1 directed that "[l]ocal judges shall decide cases in the name of
the Russian [Rossiiskoi] Republic and be guided in their decisions and judgment by the laws of
the overthrown governments only insofar as such laws have not been abrogated by the revolution
and do not contradict the revolutionary conscience and revolutionary legal consciousness." See
Decree No. 1,supra note 12. Richard Pipes has noted that this was like "[n]othing [that] ... had
ever happened anywhere: Soviet Russia was the first state in history formally to outlaw law."
PIPES, supra note 11, at 796. Lenin "believed that one of the cardinal mistakes of the Paris
Commune had been its failure to abolish France's legal system. This mistake he meant to avoid.
In late 1918, he defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as 'rule unrestricted by any law.'" Id
P.I. Stuchka, the first President of the USSR Supreme Court and one of the commissars who had
signed this decree, put it in more ideological terms: "Communism means not the victory of
socialist law, but the victory of socialism over any law, since with the abolition of classes with
their antagonistic interests, law will die out altogether." HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE INTHE
U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 26 (1963).

Kahn, supra note 4, at 380-87.
"SVlasihin, supra note 7, at 1205. Vlasihin also quotes the words of then-U.S. Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh, who reached the same conclusion following a trip to the Soviet
Union in 1990.
16 William E. Butler, FederalismorFederationism,100 MICH. L. REV. 1444, 1448 (2002)
14
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What exactly is meant by the more normative "Law" is a subject of
considerable theoretical study, but at the very least it has been agreed that it
means that the law is not arbitrary or capricious, but rather "accessible, precise
and foreseeable in its application .... ,, To what extent the law is just and
equitable is as much a matter for the politicians to determine as for the
lawyers, though each have an inextricable part to play. 19
In the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, something noteworthy has
often been overlooked. For all its faults, there was a value even to this law
with a lower-case "1"in the Soviet Union. And when the state collapsed, it
was law that remained. Collapse did not result in widespread or lasting
anarchy, violence, or substantial civil unrest.20 One flag was lowered and
another was raised. Laws continued to be passed with the same feverish

(reviewing
(2002)).

JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA

17 Id.

IS Nasrulloyev v. Russia, App. No. 656/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 71 (2007). See also Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom (no. 1), 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1979) ("In the Court's
opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression 'prescribed by
law'. Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case.
Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate
advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which
a given action may entail."). See also Kahn, supra note 4, at 358-66.
'9See, e.g., BRIANZ. TAMANAHA, AGENERALJURISPRUDENCEOFLAWANDSOCIETY 98-99
(2001) (drawing on the work of Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller).
20 See BROWN, supra note 10, at 308; see also ARCHIE BROWN, SEVEN YEARS THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD: PERESTROIKA N PERSPECTIVE 329-30 (2007). This is not to discount
the effect of nationalist violence, most notably in the South Caucasus in 1989-1990 and the
Baltics in January 1991. See BROWN, supra note 10, at 262-66, 279-85; NICHOLAS V.
RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 594-96 (5th ed. 1993). Nor is it to dismiss the postcollapse violence in former union republics or the extreme social and economic deterioration in
Russia and elsewhere that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of which is well known
and amply documented. See, e.g., EDWARD ACTON, RUSSIA: THE TSARIST AND SOVIET
LEGACY 344-49 (2d ed. 1995); William Tompson, Economic Policy Under Yeltsin And Putin,
in 5 DEVELOPMENTS N RUSSIAN POLITICS 171-79 (Stephen White et al., eds. 2001). But,
besides the three fatalities during the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, the legal
end of the Soviet Union that occurred four months later was accomplished in a peaceful manner;
the army stayed in its barracks, and a new leadership exchanged places with the old. See Martin
McCauley, FromPerestroikaTowardsA New Order, 1985-1995,in RUSSIA: AHISTORY 411-12
(Gregory L. Freeze, ed. 1997); see generally DAVID REMNICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS
OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE (1993).
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intensity as before. Life went on, although in a place that suffered
dramatically from the displacement and shock of collapse. 2
That is not to say that the passage of all these laws checked the feeling of
lawlessness that overwhelmed the society. Even the passage of a new
Constitution was marred by violence and suspicion about the legitimacy of the
referendum that ratified it.22 Federal-regional relations frayed as disputes arose
about the proper allocation of authority between Moscow and places like
Kazan', Ufa, and Grozny.2 s Few trusted the courts. Taxes went unpaid.24
Property rights were unsettled.

The BOpbI

B 3aKOHe

[vory v zakone]

(professional class of thieves) were emboldened and a new class of oligarchs
was born.2" And, as for the rule of law, in a world of up-and-coming oligarchs,
the old Russian saying for many rang true: <(BoraToMy H.ATH B cyzA - Tp1IHTpaBa; 6eRHOMy - AtOnOi roRIoBa.)> ["Bogatomu idti v sud - tryn-trava;
bednomu - doloi golova"].26

21 William E. Butler makes this general point in his review of my book, although he

attributes this achievement to the underlying structure of international legal treaties bywhich the
Soviet Union was first formed. See Butler, supra note 16, at 1445-46.
22 STEPHEN WHITE ET AL., How RUSSIA VOTES 98-100 (1997). Official statistics reported
that 54.8% of the electorate participated in the referendum held December 12, 1993, and 58.4%
of participants voted to approve the draft constitution, making a total of 31% of the electorate
who voted in favor. By presidential decree, the constitution would be considered approved if
accepted by a majority vote, with at least half of the electorate participating. This violated the
October 1990 Law on Referendums, which required the approval of half of the total electorate
for passage of a measure. See ((0 pe4)epeHgyMe PoccHfIcKoi (IeepauHH>, Co6paHHe
3aKooaaTeicbTBo PoccuiicKofi be~lepatHI, 1995 X2 42, CT. 392 1, craTA 37, reprintedin B.A.
CrpamyH, (Dezaepaimnoe KOHCTHTytIIoHHoe npao POCCHH: OCHOsHie HCTO4HHKH 181 (1996).
It also violated the 1978 Constitution, which required the approval of two-thirds of the members
of the Congress of People's Deputies as well as the approval of the regions of the RSFSR.
KOHCT. PC'DCP (B peataKnim OT 10 IeKa6pR 1992 r.), cTaTbh 185.
23 See generally KAHN, supra note 16.
24 W.E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 517 (2d ed. 2003); Alexander N. Domrin, From
Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia, 15
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 521-22 (2006).
25 See generally DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE OLIGARCHS: WEALTH AND POWER IN THE NEW
RUSSIA (2002); Louise Shelley, Crime and Corruption, in 5 DEVELOPMENTS IN RusSIAN
POLITICS, supra note 20, at 239-53; Peter Rutland & Natasha Kogan, The Russian Mafia:
Between Hype andReality, in CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICS: A READER 139-47 (Archie
Brown ed., 200 1); ALENA V. LEDENEVA, RUSSIA'S ECONOMY OF FAVORS: BLAT, NETWORKING
AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE (1998).
26 BjiaAHMHp Aaib, HocJoBHIJsl pyccoro Iapoata 169 (1957) ("If a rich person goes to

court, it's all the same for him; if a poor person does, he loses his head.").
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But the fact of the matter was that there seemed to be enough law, and
enough attention to law (if not respect for the rule of law), that it played a
considerable part in organizing the way collapse occurred. An agreement
signed by the heads of three states in Minsk in 1991 began the legal process of
ending a union that a 1922 treaty between four states had created under
international law.27 Legal positivism also seems to have been the agreed
starting point for what sort of government actions would tend to legitimize a
state that was, in a manner of speaking, starting over. It mattered that the
rhetoric of law and lawfulness was chosen as the motif of reform, even if not
always enforced (or followed) by officials or believed by the populace. 2' A
new Constitution has lasted without the need for substantial revision or
amendment. 29 That feeling of lawlessness has ebbed a bit and has been
replaced by views that opinion polls tell us indicate broad, if abstract, support
for rule-of-law values, but an equally widely-shared despair about their
practical existence in everyday life.30 That general support for the rule of law
27 3aaBrielHe rilaB rocytapcrB Pecny6 nIIKH Benapycb, PCI3CP, YKpaHHbI (MiHCK, 8

AeKa6pa 1991 r.); Decree on the Denunciation of the Treaty on the Foundation of the USSR,
Be~toMocTH Ce3ta HapoAIHblX AenyraToB PCOCP H BepxoaHoro CoBera PCDCP 1991,
No. 51, Item 1799, translatedin RUSSIAN PUBLIC LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW
STATE 3 (William E. Butler ed. & trans., 2005)). See also Butler, supra note 16, at 1445;
BUTLER, supranote 24, at 655. Mikhail Gorbachev was not invited to participate. See BROWN,
supra note 10, at 304.
28 For an interesting perspective on the "ambivalence" inherent in this motif, see Stephen
Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 19, 44-46 (Jos6
Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003).
29 The Constitution has been altered to reflect the reduction ofthe total number of constituent
units of the Russian Federation from eighty-nine to eighty-five. CompareKOHCT. PC), cTaTb3 65
(1993), and the current version KOHCT. P(b, craTbA 65. These changes are made by adoption of
a federal constitutional law. See KoHcT. P'1, cTaTbA 137(1). Other provisions of the
Constitution, concerning the fundamentals of the constitutional system, rights and freedoms of
the individual and citizen, and constitutional amendments and revision of the Constitution were
deliberately made exceptionally difficult to alter. See KoHcr. PD, cTaTbs 135. No such
substantive constitutional reform has occurred to date, although President Putin was widely held
to possess ample political capital to do so. See, e.g., Hans Oversloot, Reordering the State
(Without Changingthe Constitution):Russia underPutin 's Rule, 2000-2008, 32 REv. CENT. &
E. EUR. L. 41,41-42,64 (2007); PETER BAKER & SUSAN GLASSER, KREMLIN RISING: VLADIMIR
PUTIN'S RUSSIA AND THE END OF REVOLUTION 310-11 (2007). That is not to say that dramatic
changes (as discussed below) have not been made to executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of the Russian state. But these changes have been accomplished within the procedures
established by the existing Constitution.
30 Nationwide surveys conducted in Russia in 1996, 1998, and 2000 revealed generally
strong, albeit abstract, support among citizens of the Russian Federation for rule-of-law
principles at levels roughly comparable to those found in Western Europe. See James L. Gibson,

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 36:511

has remained in place, sometimes because of and sometimes despite Vladimir
Putin's presidency.
So the first theme to keep in mind is that Russia is not tabula rasawhen it
comes to law and legislation. Russia is not starting from scratch, which
certainly has advantages, but it has the disadvantage of a lot of bad legal
habits. Worst of these is a historical attachment to bare legal positivism as a
tool for state control.
B. The Hazards of Hasty Conclusions
The second note of caution relates to the first: beware of the timeliness of
assessing Russian law now. An assessment exercise such as this risks making
premature conclusions. Walter Bagehot, commenting on the British Reform
Acts of 1832 and 1867, observed that:
A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as all
its subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as long as its
statesmen were trained by that old Constitution. It is not really
tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen and among a
people neither of whom are guided by a different experience.3
It is good to recall Bagehot's reluctance to comment on the future of his
own unwritten constitution in commenting on the Russian constitution in the
twenty-first century. All of Russia's statesmen-to stretch a term to include

RussianAttitudes Towards the Rule ofLaw: An Analysis of Survey Data, in LAW AND INFORMAL
PRACTICES: THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 77,88 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan
eds., 2003). But, when asked to apply those ideals to their own circumstances, a 2004
nationwide survey found that "[a]n overwhelming majority of Russians do not think that they
live under a rule-of-law state...." Richard Rose et al., ResignedAcceptance of an Incomplete
Democracy: Russia's Political Equilibrium, 20 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 195, 200 (2004).
Likewise, although 36% of over 1,600 respondents to an April 2007 poll felt that "equality
before the law" had improved under Vladimir Putin (16% felt equality had worsened), Richard
Rose, The Impact of PresidentPutin on PopularSupportforRussia'sRegime, 23 POST-SOVIET
AFFAIRS 97, 104 (2007), 68% of 1,600 respondents to a poll a few months before indicated that
they did not feel themselves to be living under the rule of law. Press-Release, JIeaaa [_errp,
Bocnpuxuue poccuAuamu eapone cKux ZewNome (Feb. 15, 2007), availableat http://www.le
vada.ru/press/2007021501.print.html. Both polls were conducted by the respected Levada
Center.
" WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAYS 3 (2d
ed. 1884).
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the politicians who inherited the opportunities Mikhail Gorbachev
created-were trained under a Soviet constitution. In Vladimir Putin's case,
this was triply so, since his legal education was at Leningrad State University
in the 1970s, the bulk of his professional experience was gained as an
unexceptional KGB spy,32 and his style of governance has been most
optimistically and euphemistically characterized as "managed" or "sovereign"
democracy.33
What is more, there have been only sixteen years of post-Soviet Russian
constitutionalism to assess (and only thirteen years under the 1993
Constitution). That is not even the span of a single generation. The
presidency of Vladimir Putin has lasted only eight years. The Council of
Europe is on record as declaring that Russia's "radical transition" should be
measured on a timescale of "quinquennia, even decades. Its pace will vary."34
That is over-optimistic. Thus, an assessment of Putin's effect on an institution
as slow-growing as the rule of law should be made with full awareness that this
legal history may be too near to the observer to draw long-term conclusions
beyond the identification of forks in the road and the risks and opportunities
revealed by the selection of one path over another.35 And yet, the topic is

32

LiLA SHEVTSOVA, PuTIN's RUSSIA 30 (2003) ("Putin retired in the rank of colonel, which

meant that he had not had a brilliant career in the KGB.").
11 The term "managed democracy" has been used both by analysts sympathetic to, and very
critical of, Putin's political style of governance. See, e.g., Michael McFaul & Kathryn StonerWeiss, The Myth of the AuthoritarianModel: How Putin'sCrackdown Holds Russia Back, 87
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 73 (2008); BAKER & GLASSER, supranote 29, at 374-75; Fred Weir, Kremlin
Lobs Another Shot at Marketplace of Ideas, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2003 (quoting
Gleb Pavlosky); Nikolai Petrov, Dizzy with Sham Success, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 4,2008. The
term "sovereign democracy" was coined by analysts (the attribution most frequently offered is
to former Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov) quite sympathetic to the Kremlin.
See Masha Lipman, Putin's 'Sovereign Democracy,' WASH. POST, July 15, 2006, at A21

(" 'Sovereign democracy' is a Kremlin coinage that conveys two messages: first, that Russia's
regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at
verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia's domestic affairs.");
Oversloot, supranote 29, at 63.
11 Eur. Parl. Assembly, Resolution 1065 on Procedurefor an Opinion on Russia'sRequest
for Membership of the Council of Europe, 27th Sess., Doc. No. 1065, 8 (1995) (resuming
procedure for Russian membership in Council of Europe following peace agreement in
Chechnya).
11 That was certainly the message the author received from leading lawyers in Russia while
conducting this sort of assessment exercise for the United States Department of Justice in 2005.
See JEFFREY KAHN, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
IN MOSCOW AND KRASNOYARSK, OCTOBER 15 -NOVEMBER 5,2005, FINALREPORT FORTHE OFF.
OF OVERSEAS PRos. DEV., Assis. AND TRAIN., CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Feb. 7, 2006)
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nevertheless worth discussing, and worth discussing now, because it is simply
astonishing how much has been accomplished-at least on paper-in such a
short span of time.
C. Law and the Economics of the Middle Class
The third note of caution: do not overestimate the power of economics in
general, and the power of a growing middle class in particular, in strengthening
the rule of law in the short term. This is the tenth successive year of 6% or
higher growth in GDP, with virtually no public debt and enormous trade and
budget surpluses.36 By some measures, the average income of the Russian
family nearly doubled within this time.37 The obvious response is to observe
that the depths to which the country had sunk make such statistics seem more
substantial than they are. Different specialists looking at this same data
observed that in real terms this growth brought Russians only up to 1991 per
capita income levels.3"
But the perception is more important than the reality. And, thanks to an
economy buoyed by steadily rising demand and heretofore unimagined prices
for oil and natural gas, the perception is one of strength, control, and
predictability. The middle class has not only grown,39 it is investing money
that remains after the rent has been paid and the bread has been bought. In
fact, rent is not the sole option anymore. Mortgages have risen 150% since last
year.4 °

(on file with author).
36 Anatole Kaletsky, Dosvidaniya Democracy, and Hello Good Times, TIMES (London),
Oct. 4, 2007.
" Igor Fedyukin, Putin's Eight Years, KOMMERSANT, Sept. 18, 2007 ("According to the
Russian Monitor ofthe Economic Situation and Public Health (RMEZ) which has monitored the
economic status and health of the population regularly since 1992, the average income of the
Russian family almost doubled between 2000 and 2006, from 6,087 rubles to 11,425 rubles.").
" Id. ("Specialists at the Independent Institute of Social Policy (IISP) estimate that the
average income per person in Russia in 2005 reached the pre-reform levels of 1991 .").
" Id. ("According to the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences in a
report 'Urban Middle Class in Russia' (2007), more than 20% of the economically active urban
population and about 14% of the country's overall population belong to the middle class.
About 22% of the population is on the periphery of the middle class. The income threshold for
middle class is 10,500 rubles per family member per month. 54% of Russia's middle class are
workers in the government sector, 16% of the middle class income is received as social aid.
Experts don't see significant prospects of the middle class growing.").
40 Mary Dejevsky, Surge in Home OwnershipHeraldsthe Rise ofthe Russian Middle Class,
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 26, 2007.
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These are good signs, of course. Scholars have often associated the rule of
law with the rise of a middle class, which lacking the customary power of the
nobility or the church, sought to strengthen law to protect its growing property
interests. But the middle class in Russia is a fragile one. What is more, it is
not the same sort of middle class found in states in which the rule of law is
seen as a successful safeguard. In the United States and Western Europe, most
people are employed in small or medium-sized businesses; by some estimates,
less than a quarter of the Russian Public is so employed.4 Half of the Russian
middle class works in state bureaucracies, not in private industry or
commerce.4 2 That suggests a middle class in terms of present wealth but
perhaps not in terms of the independence that leads a middle class to seek
protection in law for its property and savings.4 3 Nor does it suggest the
resilience through which a middle class can weather difficult times and still
survive to exert its influence.
So, if support for the rule of law still requires a supporter on the top, that
brings us back to the initial question: Has Vladimir Putin been that man?" Is

" See Stephen Kotkin, E-Notes: Russia UnderPutin: TowardDemocracyorDictatorship?,
FOR. POL'Y RES. INST., Mar. 2007, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200703.kotkin.russiademocracy
dictatorship.html. Kotkin states (without citation) that 70% of employment in the U.S. and
Europe is in small and medium-sized businesses, but that "Russia doesn't even approach 25
percent for such employment." Id. Rather, Kotkin observes, "A tiny fraction of the Russian
middle class owns their own businesses, but by and large, Russia's middle class is not
independent, small- or medium-sized business owners." Id. "They're bureaucrats and
functionaries, law enforcement officials and tax collectors, inspectors and education overseers.
They work in the KGB successor, the FSB, and in the big state-owned gas, oil, automobile, or
defense companies." Id.
42 Id.
" This nuance was not lost on early reformers in the Yeltsin administration after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Both Yeltsin and his then-close advisor Anatoly Chubais put this view into
popular terms in the early 1990s with the slogan: "We do not need hundreds of millionaires, but
millions of property owners." Quoted in HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 308.
4 Much is often made of the assertion that Putin himself is a lawyer. It may be more correct
to say that he attendedlaw school and then later returned to work in one as a KGB political
officer. One doubts that his black Labrador, Koni, is named after the most famous tsarist-era
lawyer, Anatolii Fedorovich Koni. See Serge Schmemann, A Visit with Putin, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 16, 2007. Russia does not have a history of lawyers as leaders. Only three lawyers
of vastly different calibers have led Russia in recent history. That can be compared with
American history, in which twenty-six of forty-three presidents have been lawyers, or the United
Kingdom, in which eleven of thirty-eight prime ministers since Pitt the Younger have been
legally trained. Norway is a little harder to compare because of the dual system of government
that existed in different forms between the Treaty of Kiel (1814) and the end of the NorwegianSwedish Union (1907). But by at least one measure, since 1814, twelve of the forty-four men
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his well-known assertion of the "dictatorship of law" closer to ruthless Stalinera prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky's cTa6HIIbHOCTb 3aKOHOB [stabil'nost'
zakonov - "stability of law"] or closer to the values of the rule of law with a
capital L?45 Put another way, to what extent have Putin's professed legal
values been sacrificed in the short-term service of unprincipled post-Soviet
political expediency?
I. THREE WINDOWS INTO THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA
Three windows shed light on the state of law in the Russian state. With the
above cautions in mind, it is worth peering through each for the different views
they present. The first is bleak. The second is hopeful. The third is
ambivalent. But their combination presents the state of Russian law in a threedimensional light that few commentators have been willing to cast on the
unfolding, complex, and unfinished story of Russia's emerging legal culture.
A. Chechnya and Terrorism
The first topic for discussion, both chronologically and thematically, in
analyzing Putin's approach to law and the rule of law must be Chechnya. The
answer to the above question about the meaning of Putin's "dictatorship of
law" is, viewed from Chechnya, unreservedly negative. That should be clear
to even the most casual observer, notwithstanding the fast-paced reconstruction
of the city of Grozny.46 This is not just because of the continued anarchy and
and women who governed Norway were legally trained or legal practitioners.
" Vladimir Putin used this phrase several times in his speeches and writings during his first
campaign for president in February 2000, at one point announcing:
In a non-law-governed (i.e. weak) state the individual is defenseless and not
free. The strongerthe state, the freerthe individual.... [D]emocracy is the
dictatorship of the law - not of those placed in an official position to defend
that law... I know there are many now that are afraid of order. But order is
nothing more than rules. And let those who are currently engaged in
substituting concepts for one another, trying to pass off the absence of order
for genuine democracy - let them, I say, stop looking for hidden dirty tricks
and trying to scare us with the past. 'Our land is rich, but there is no order in
it,' they used to say in Russia. Nobody will ever say such tings about us in
future.
Vladimir Putin's Open Letter to Russian Voters, Feb. 25, 2000, availableat http://www.cdi.org/
russia/johnson/4133.html (emphasis in original). For a general discussion of Putin's use of this
phrase, see KAHN, supra note 16, at 238-39; Kahn, supra note 4, at 394-407.
4 C.J. Chivers, Under Iron Hand of Russia's Proxy, a Chechen Revival, N.Y. TIMES,
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feudalism by which Chechnya is now, in turns, governed by Ramzan Kadyrov.
It is also because of the way Putin used Chechnya to justify his executive
vertical of power and his so-called "dictatorship of law." A struggle against
Chechen separatists was recharacterized as a battle against international
terrorists and religious fanatics.47 The new fight was deemed to require not
only a military response but a statewide legal restructuring as well.4"
Chechnya provided a challenge and an opportunity to Putin from the
moment of his ascension to power. President Boris Yeltsin nominated Putin
to the post of Russian Prime Minister two days after Shamil Basayev and Emir
Khattab launched a surprise incursion into Dagestan.49 The State Duma (the
lower chamber of the federal parliament) confirmed this nomination on
August 16, 1999.50 In the next thirty days, Putin was confronted with a
bombing under Manezh Square in central Moscow that killed one person and
injured forty (Aug. 31, 1999);51 an explosion in Buinaksk, Dagestan, that killed
more than sixty people (Sept. 4, 1999);52 the Moscow apartment bombings that
killed more than 300 people (Sept. 9 & 13, 1999);13 and another apartment
bombing in Volgodonsk that killed eighteen people (Sept. 16, 1999)."

Sept. 30, 2007, at Al ("As recently as early 2006, Grozny was less a city than rows of shattered
buildings overlooking cesspools. It now has electricity almost around the clock and reliable
natural gas service. Many neighborhoods have water. Block upon block of housing complexes
have been rebuilt, and families have moved into buildings that a year ago were buckling shells.
Markets are crowded with products, from computers and furniture to air-conditioners, flat-screen
televisions and new cars.").
47 See infra note 56; see also Thomas de Waal, Introduction to ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, A
DIRTY WAR: A RUSSIAN REPORTER IN CHECHNYA xvi (2001); ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, PUTN'S

RUSSIA: LIFE IN AFAILING DEMOCRACY 161 (Arch Tait trans., 2004); SHEVTSOVA, supranote 32,
at 38; BAKER&GLASSER, supranote 29, at 123; Masha Lipman, Putin'sSpreading War,WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2005, at A15.
48

49

See infra text accompanying notes 77-85.
De Waal, supra note 47, at xviii. The incursion began on August 7, 1999.

" Russia: Yeltsin Says New Prime Minister Should Be Next President, Aug. 9, 1999,
available at http://www.rferl.org/features/1999/08/f.ru.990809161 358.asp; Julie A. Corwin,
Duma Confirms Putin, RADIO FREE EUR.iRADIO LIBERTY, Aug. 17, 1999, available at http://
www.rferl.org/newsline/1 999/08/1 -rus/rus- 170899.asp.
SI Amelia Gentleman, Who is Bombing Russia?, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 12, 1999.
52 Patrick E. Tyler, 6 Convicted in Russia Bombing That Killed 68, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2001, at Al.
13 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 29, at 54.
14

Michael R. Gordon, Another Bombing Kills 18 in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at
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Putin, immediately and without hesitation, launched an overwhelming
military campaign in Chechnya." This was done under the label of an "antiterrorist operation. ' 5 6 In reality, it was the start of a second brutal war that had
already killed as many as 100,000 people.5 7 The explosions and attacks that
punctuated Putin's inauguration reversed public opinion from its increasing
opposition to the first Chechen war to upwards of 70% approval for a military
solution in Chechnya.5" Putin seized on the change in mood, restarted the war,
recharacterized it as a limited counterterrorism mission, and used it to justify
the centralization of executive power.
This terrorism-some of it claimed, some of unknown or disputed
origin-did not abate in the face of this show of force. To the contrary,
Moscow was pockmarked with new terrorism. An explosion under Pushkin
Square killed eight people on August 8, 2000."9 The October 2002 hostage
crisis at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, and the subsequent counteroffensive by Russian special forces, resulted in the death of 130 hostages and
the terrorists.6 ° In and around Moscow, suicide attacks were launched at a rock
concert (July 2003, eighteen people killed),6 the Hotel National

" Putin's approach to Chechnya has been unwavering since his first statements on the
subject as Prime Minister. In autumn 1999, he famously responded to renewed fighting in the
North Caucasus with a crude announcement that Russia would "pursue the terrorists
everywhere," and even "rub them out in the outhouse." Michael Wines, The World: Blowback;
In Moscow, a Whiff of TerrorFrom Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999. An excerpt from the press
conference in Astana, where President Putin gave these remarks is available on the Russian
version of YouTube. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PdYRZSW-I (oMi 6yaeM
npecleiloBaT TeppopHcroa Be3Ae, B a3ponop'ry - B a3ponopTy. 3Haqrr, BII yK MenA
H3BHHHTe, B Tyaiere nofiMaeM, Mid H B copTHpe fix 3aMOqHM, B KOHte KoHUtOB. Bce, sonpoc
3aKpbrIT oKoHqaTeIrHo.>>) ["We will pursue the terrorists everywhere, to the airport - to the
airport. That means, excuse me, [if] we catch [them] in the toilet, we will rub them out in the
outhouse in the end. That's it, the question is completely closed."].
56 Vladimir Putin, Opinion, Why We Must Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999 (stating that
"[t]he antiterrorist campaign was forced upon us," and asserting links between Chechen rebels
and international terrorists, including Osama bin Laden).
" Estimates of deaths in the first Chechen War (1994-1996) range from 20,000 (Anatol
Lieven), to 80,000 (General Aleksandr Lebed') to 100,000 (Grigorii Yavlinsky). ANATOL
LIEVEN, CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RuSSIAN POWER 108 (1998); Archie Brown, The Russian
Crisis: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?, 15 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 58 (1999)
(quoting Lebed'); Grigori Yavlinsky, An UncertainPrognosis, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 4 (1997).
58 SHEVTSOVA, supra note 32, at 39.

59Patrick E. Tyler, Rush-Hour Bomb Attack Kills 8 in Central Moscow, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2000.
60 BAKER & GLASSER, supranote 29, at 172.
61 ARperl CKpo6OT , )LJMHTpH CHMaKHH, LIepnbnu npadnuK 6 Tywuno, HE3ABHCI4MAM
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(December 2003, approximately six people killed),62 and the Moscow metro
(February 2004, approximately forty people killed; August 2004, Rizhskaya
bombing killed ten people).63 Outside of the capital, a passenger train was
attacked in southern Russia in December 2003 killing approximately forty
people.' 4 Two domestic aircraft exploded almost simultaneously in
August 2004, killing eighty-nine people.65 In Beslan, at least 330 people,
mostly children, were killed by an attack and botched rescue at an elementary
school's opening day.66
Recounting this bloody timeline serves to highlight two independent,
retarding effects on the rule of law in Russia. The first was the creation of a
legal blackhole in a geographic territory that, ironically, Russia claimed to be
an integral part of the Russian Federation. Russian military action in
Chechnya, contrary to President Putin's repeated claims, was neither targeted,
nor precise, nor surgical in nature. In response to terrorist attacks in Moscow
and the provinces that left Russians feeling besieged and vulnerable, Putin
permitted an onslaught on an entire republic within the Russian Federation.
The Russian army (unmanaged by officers who could barely feed and clothe
the untrained conscripts sent to fight) indiscriminately killed, destroyed, and
stole.67 Their conduct was mirrored by Chechen rebels and brigands.68 Human

FA3ETA, 7 HioJn. 2003 r., available at http://www.ng.n/events/2003-07-07/1_tushino.html;
IOpHr FaBpmnOB, Hepecuompa ne 6yOem: Bepxoenbifi cy6 PO ocmaeu e cwze npueo8op
teiencKou meppopucmke, POCCI4ICKAI FA3ETA, 1 CenT316pb 2004 r., availableat http://www.

rg.ru/2004/09/01/zarema.html.
62 CauaA o6binaa 6om6a: fIcnoJnumeJlbHuzjef meparma na Moxoeofi 6bvza M Oooan
mcenzquna 6 c8emfo nafibmo, HE3AB4CtMA" FA3ETA, I IaeKa6pb 2003 r., availableat http://

www.ng.ru/events/2003-12-1 1/7_bomb.html; IAM 3y6KO, Pa3bCKueaemcA uaxutma e tuy6e,
POCCRAiCKAsI FA3ETA - HEAIFA, 11 AeKa6pb 2003 r., available at http://www.rg.ru/2003/12/
1 1/terakt.html.
63 BjIaAHMHp ceaoexHKO,

Mempo 6cop6aa

cMepmnuK: Fraiaiaa 6epcua mepaKma

noomeepm'cdena, POCCHiCKAA FA3ETA, 18 4eapamn 2004 r., availableat http://www.rg.ru/20
04/02/18/smertnik.html; Aiapei lllapoB, B MocKee utqym "vepnybo 8aoey": H13 nemblpex
meppopucmoK, HanpaeueuuxcA e cmo.uzy, 8 .CUabiX ocmalaCb moMbMo o~a,POCCOI4CKAI
FA3ETA, 2 ceHTa6px 2004 r., available at http://www.rg.ru/2004/09/02/shahidki.html.
' Atiapei mapoB, A.rm~nMia "beJn,=urMHa, HaTabA Ko3noaa, tepuaA namnuya 6
EcceHmyKax: B3pbi6 8 npueopoOnor ahermpuxKe yuec 40 jicuHe. Ho amo qucjo ne
oKoniame,7bHoe, POCCHRCKAI FA3ETA - HEJERtsI, 2003 r., availableat http://www.rg.ru/2003/
12/06/vzriv.html.
61 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 29, at 19.
66
67
68

Id. at 35.
See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, A DIRTY WAR, supra note 47.
Id.
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Rights Commissioners from the Council of Europe consistently condemned
widespread and gross violations of human rights, violations of international
humanitarian law, and crimes committed by all sides in the Chechen conflict.69
In 2005, these rapporteurs described the result: a "climate of impunity" in the
republic."0 In March, the Council's human rights commissioner and its AntiTorture Committee condemned unlawful detention, torture, and cruelty
throughout the republic. 7 Beginning in 2002, and continuing thereafter with
judgments too numerous to mention, the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg has repeatedly found Russia liable for violations of the
Convention's protection of life and prohibitions against torture and inhumane
treatment in cases of disappearances, torture, summary execution, and other
crimes in Chechnya.72

69 ALVARO GiL-ROBLES, COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM'R FOR HuM. RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON His VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (IN PARTICULAR

CHECHNYA, DAGHESTAN AND INGOUSHETIA), 2, 5 (Dec. 7-10, 1999), availableat https://wcd.
coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id--980347&Site=COE&BackColorlntemet=DBDCF2&BackColorlntrane
t=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864; ALVARO GIL-ROBLES, COUNCILOF EUR. COMM'R FOR
HUM. RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON His VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA, 25TH FEBRUARY TO THE 4TH MARCH 2001,
IV(l) (Mar. 14, 2001), availableathttps://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=980643&Site=Comm
DH&BackColorintemet=-FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=-FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679
("I have arrived at a point I consider to be of the utmost importance for the restoration of peace
and ordinary living conditions in Chechnya. As I have already suggested, an environment of fear
and insecurity obtains throughout the territory of the Chechen Republic. This is attributable to
the actions of Chechen combatants as much as it is to those of the Federal forces. As
investigations into such acts are rarely carried to their proper conclusion, an impression of
lawlessness and impunity is increasingly pervasive."); COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM'R FOR HUM.
RIGHTS, INITIAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE VISIT OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

1 MARCH 2007),
availableathttps://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH(2007)6&Language=lanEnglish&V
er=original&Site=CommDH&BackColorIntemet=DBDCF2&BackColorlntranet-FDC864&Ba
ckColorLogged=FDC864 ("Through [Thomas Hammarberg's] conversations with the inmates,
he became increasingly convinced of the existence of the use of torture and ill-treatment by the
law enforcement agents, whether republican or federal, during the investigative proceedings.").
70 See DAVID ATKINSON & RUDOLF BINDIG, COMM. ON THE HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS &
COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS &
COMMITMENTS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, DOC. 10568, 62 (June 3, 2005), availableat
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/workingdocs/doc05/edoc 10568.htm.
"' Asya Umarova & Laura Aldamova, Chechnya: Human Rights Hopes Dashed,INST. FOR
WAR AND PEACE REPORTING: CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, Mar. 15,2007, http://www.iwpr.
net/?p=crs&s=f&o=334109&aspcstate=henpcrs.
72 For a brief summary of the issues presented in the first cases, see J.D. Kahn, Russia 's
"Dictatorshipof Law" and the European Court of Human Rights, 29 REv. CENT. & E. EUR.
CHECHEN REPUBLIC OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (27 FEBRUARY THROUGH
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The second effect was the expansion and strengthening of already broad
federal executive powers without augmenting judicial or legislative powers
that could serve as checks on unbridled executive discretion. This second
effect may well turn out to be the more insidious, and longer lasting, of the
two. A certain callousness towards the law spread north from the Caucasus as
everything was covered in the sticky patina of fighting terrorism. Suspects in
the Moscow and regional apartment bombings were whisked out of local
custody and into secret proceedings in closed courtrooms.7 3 The indisputable
advances in the reform of criminal procedure were routinely ignored by
regional officials who, taking their cue from Moscow, viewed certain
exceptional cases as exempt from requirements of code or case law.74 This is
not always true, and the case of Colonel Budanov, ultimately sentenced to ten
years' imprisonment for the brutal rape and murder of a Chechen civilian is
evidence of that." But there are very few Budanov cases compared to the
number of Budanovs.76
The war in Chechnya and the terrorism that the renewed fighting did not
stop-and probably further sparked-was also the ultimate catalyst for many
of the political reforms that Putin adopted to strengthen the "executive

L. 1, 10-14 (2004). Some of the most recent cases involving Chechnya, are: Betayeva v. Russia,
App. 37315/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (finding violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, and 13);
Gekhayeva v. Russia,App. 1755/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (finding violations of Articles 2, 3, 5,
and 13); lbragimov v. Russia, App. 34561/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (same); Sangariyeva v.
Russia,App. 1839/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (same); Utsayeva v. Russia, App. 29133/03, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2008) (finding violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, 13 and a failure to comply with
Article 38(1)(a)); Betayev v. Russia, App. 7653/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (same); Aziyevy v.
Russia, App. 77626/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Imakayeva v. Russia, App. No. 7615/02, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2007) (discussing violation of Article 8); Bazorkina v. Russia, App. 69481/01, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2006) (discussing violation of Articles 2(2), 3, 5(1) & 13); Luluyev v. Russia, App.
No. 69480/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) (same); Estamirov v. Russia, App. No. 60272/00, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2006) (discussing violation of Article 2(2) & 13).
71Gail W. Lapidus, Putin "sWar on Terrorism: Lessonsfrom Chechnya, 18 POST-SOVIET
AFF. 41, 43 (2002).
74POLITKOVSKAYA, A DIRTY WAR, supranote 47, at 34 (describing repeated violations of
"a progressive code of criminal procedure in conformity with the highest European standards").
In this chapter, Politkovskaya examines the case file for judicial proceedings brought against an
aide to former Chechen President Asian Maskhadov. Id.
75Id.at 42. Politkovskaya, although drawing more pessimistic conclusions about the
Russian criminal justice system, nevertheless praises the "courageous" conduct of the judge in
Budanov's case, Vladimir Bukreev, and the military officer whose permission she asserts was
required for prosecutors to bring an indictment, General Gerasimov. Id.at 53.
76 See, e.g., Michael Schwirtz, Russian Military Officers Are Convicted of Killing 6
Chechens, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007.
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vertical" as he called it. Plenty of laws have been passed to broaden the
powers of law enforcement officials, diminish press freedoms, and provide for
special legal regimes during presidentially declared states of emergency. 77
There is nothing altogether surprising about that. Many states have responded
to self-defined acts of terrorism in the same way, albeit to widely varying
degrees. Putin took his opportunity a step further, however. In the spring
of 2000, Putin began to centralize control over all federal politics, first by
creating presidential envoys by decree,78 and then restructuring federal
legislative representation with a string of statutes.79 Immediately after the
Beslan atrocities in 2004, plans were unveiled to end the popular election of
regional governors, to end the election of single-mandate constituencies in the
federal Duma, and establish a presidentially controlled civic forum-the Public
Chamber." The President's explicitly stated justification for all of these
changes was to fight terrorism.8 ' Of course, the detailed nature of the draft
legislation, and its close fit with previous reforms, made it difficult to believe
that Beslan was the catalyst, rather than the excuse, for this next round of

77 cDe2epainHbIl 3aKoH OT 25 HionR 2002 r. No 1 12-03 "0 BHeceHm

tonoJ1HeHHni

Oejtepajbnoro

3aKoHOaTeABHbie aKrbi POCCHrICKOi

H3MeIeImI

Y

cDeatepaIHH

B CBR3H C npIHHMTHem
3aKoHa "0 npoTHBogeicTBHH 31cTpeMHcTcKoi AerreAnbHocTH' [Federal Law

B

"On the Introduction of Changes and Additions to the Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
in connection with the Acceptance ofthe Federal Law'On Counteracting Extremist Activity."'];
0etepaubnbii KOHCTH'rynHOHHbIi 3aKOH OT 30 Max 2001 r. No 3-OK3 "0 qpe3BbmlaiiHOM
noJio)KeHHH," (c H3MeHeHHMH OT 30 H1OHA 2003 r., 7 mapTa 2005 r.) [Federal Constitutional
Law No. 3-FKZ "On the State of Emergency," English translation, available at http://www.leg
islationline.org/legislation.php?tid=46&lid=60 1&less=false].
" Yia3 lpe3HtaeHTa P4 ((0nojnlOMo'qHoM npeacTaBIrene Hpe3HAteHTa P4) B 43egepaiHOM
oKpyre,>> No 849, 13 Mam 2000 r., COiEP. 3AKOH. No 20, 15 MaA 2000 r., cT. 2112, crp. 4318. See
also PoccIgIcKAn rA3ETA, 16 maA 2000 r., cap. 5. For description and analysis of this decree,
see KAHN, supra note 16, at 252-67. Some have begun to forecast the end of the polpredy
system, arguing that it has served its purpose and the president who created it. Paul Goble, Putin
Likely to DisbandPresidentialPlenopotentiarySystem, WINDOW ON EURASIA, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.con/2007/1O/window-on-eurasia-putin-likely-to.html (Tamsma
CTaHoBaa, H~oce7ednue u3 noAnpedoe, Oct. 4, 2007, availableat http://www.politcom.ru/print.
php?id=5176); see also Oversloot, supra note 29, at 51 ("We may perhaps expect that having
appointedgovernors will make the office ofpolpred obsolete again, and perhaps, indeed, the
function ofpolpred will atrophy in the (near) future.").
7 For description and analysis of these statutes, see KAHN, supra note 16, at 252-67.
o See Vladimir Putin, President, Russ. Fed'n, Speech at the Enlarged Government Meeting
with the Government and Heads of the Regions (Sept. 13, 2004) (transcript available at http://
www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/09/13/0000_type82912type82913_76667.shtml#).
s' Id.
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changes. s2 In any event, the president now nominates candidates for the chief
executive position in each region to a regional legislature that may be
disbanded if it ultimately fails to approve the candidate.. 3 These executives
can be dismissed and the legislatures prorogued for a variety of reasons that
ultimately are the prerogative of the president to initiate. Most notably, the
president's nominee to head the region, even after ratified by the regional
legislature, may be dismissed by presidential ukaz for "loss of trust" of the
president or "improper execution of duties," presumably in the opinion of the
president. s4
This change did not merely alter the democratic accountability of regional
officials; it also altered the composition of the upper chamber of the federal
parliament-the Council of the Federation-whose members are now
appointed by the regional executive and legislative branches that are, in turn,
susceptible to extreme pressure by the President.
These reforms made President Putin (and his foreseeable successors in
office) beholden, in a way, to the strong men he placed as satraps in the
Caucasus, men such as Kadyrov. 85 The price of maintaining order in the North
Caucasus now includes accession to the violence done to the rule of law there
by local chiefs whose approach to government is often medieval. Cooptation
is a two-way street.
B. Russia and the Council of Europe
Physically, legally, and psychologically, the wars and chaos in Chechnya
suggest that Russia is quite far from its constitutional claim to be a democratic,
federal, rule-of-law state. 6 Russian participation in the Council of Europe
system, on the other hand, suggests a closer approximation to that goal, and a
broad willingness at the highest levels of institutional and personal politics to

82

Oversloot, supra note 29, at 49 ("However, the propositions made on 13 September were

so detailed-and fit in so well with previous policies-that it is fully incredible that preparations
for these institutional changes had started just after 'Beslan.' ").
83 CTaTa 1, 2) (6), qIDeepamnHbii 3aKOH OT 11 eKa6pA 2004 r. X2 159-03, 0 BHeceHHnH
H3MeHeHHH B 43e~lepaibHblri 3RKOH <<06 o6IuHX nPHHtHInax opraHH3aunH 3aKOHOQaTeJlbHb1X
(npegcTaBTejrmbHax) H HcnoIHHTej/bHblX opranon rocyqapcTBeHHori BJqac'rH cy6'belroB
POCCrICKOfi (1)ejepatmni> H B 4 egepaJHbIi 3aKOH 006 OCHOBHbix rapaHTrax H36HpaTeiHbiX
npan H npaaa Ha y'acTHe B pe4)epeHtayMe rpacaH POCCHdCKOi 'be(epaXtH>.
84 Id., crambA 1, 5).
85
86

Oversloot, supra note 29, at 53.
See supra note 3.
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build a modem legal culture. Russia applied to join the Council in the spring
of 1992, less than six months after the end of Soviet power." Russia signed
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1996 and ratified it
with some reservations in 1998.88 Accession was slowed considerably by the
first Chechen War (1994-1996).' 9 Thus, the bulk of Russia's stay under this
human rights and rule-of-law based umbrella organization has been during
Vladimir Putin's term of office. 90
Much good has come from Russian membership from just about every
perspective, but especially from a legal one. The Council of Europe invited
Russia to become a member with a large number of conditions attached.9"
" The Russian tricolor replaced the Soviet hammer and sickle on Christmas Day 1991.
Russia applied for membership on May 7, 1992. Bill Bowring, Russia's Accession to the
Council ofEurope and Human Rights: Compliance or Cross-Purposes,6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 628, 628-43 (1997).
88 Russia signed the ECHR on February 28, 1996. See Council of Europe Treaty Office,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Chart of
Signatures & Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=0
05&CM=8&DF=9/24/2007&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). President Boris Yeltsin
signed the federal law ratifying the treaty on March 30, 1998. See «0)paTHHKaUHH KOHBeHLIHH
o 3amirre npaB qenoBeKa HOCHOBHbIX cBo6oa H ipOTOKOnOB KHeH,)) Corp. 3AKOH., 1998 No 42,
cT. 1514, cTp. 2939-40 (Ratification was made with reservations lodged on May 5, 1998).
89 See Eur. Part. Assembly, Resolution On Russia's Requestfor Membership in the Light of
the Situation in Chechnya, 27th Sess. Doc. No. 1055 (1995) (suspending membership process
after "unreservedly" condemning the "indiscriminate and disproportionate" use of force by
Russia in Chechnya and declaring the same in violation of Russia's international obligations);
see also Eur. Parl. Assembly, Resolution 1065 ofProcedureForan Opinionon Russia's request
for Membership of the Council of Europe, 27th Sess., Doc. No. 1065, 11 (1995) (resuming
procedure for Russian membership in Council of Europe following peace agreement in
Chechnya).
9'What is more, the Council of Europe commissioned monitors to report on progress within
Russia towards meeting its legal and political obligations in the Council of Europe. These
reports were completed in 1998, 2002, and 2005, providing useful Russia-specific benchmarks
to assess progress in a wide range ofareas. See RUDOLF BiNDIG &ERNST MUEHLEMANN, COMM.
ON THE HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS & COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF
EUR., HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,

Doc. 8127 (June 2, 1998), availableat http://assembly.coe/int/main.asp?Link=/documents/wo
DAVID ATKINSON & RUDOLF BINDIG, COMM. ON THE

rkingdocs/doc98/edoc8127.htm;

HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS & COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR.,
HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Doc. 9396

(Mar. 26, 2002), availableathttp://assembly.coe.intmain.asp?Link=-/documents/workingdocs/
doc02/edoc9396.htm; ATKINSON & BINDIG, supra note 70.
9"Eur. Part. Assembly, Opinion on Russia's Request for Membership of the Council of
Europe, 1996 Sess., Doc. No. 193 (1996) [hereinafter Russia's Request]; Eur. Parl. Assembly,
Invitation to the Russian Federationto Become a Member of the Councilof Europe, Council of
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New legal codes were required, including codes of civil and criminal law and
procedure.92 Council of Europe conventions and protocols against torture, the
death penalty, and many others were to be ratified on strict timetables.93
The Council of Europe took a considerable institutional risk in allowing
Russia to join its club. 94 The number one fear was not that the Council would
be ineffective in promoting political and legal reforms in Russia. Although
that was certainly a serious concern, that was really just one fear of many. As
noted below, it has yet to be determined whether membership's benefits to
Russia and the Council of Europe as a whole outweighed membership's risks.
When that verdict is returned, however, it is likely that the Council of Europe
will be seen to have done more to advance the rule of law in Russia than any
other single institution, political circumstance, or individual actor.
The overriding fear was rather that Russian noncompliance with Council
norms and obligations would destroy the Council of Europe from within.
Chechnya was the most striking example of how the Council's effectiveness
was challenged by its new member. The excesses of the Second Chechen War,
if initially popular in Russia, evoked a crisis in Europe and resulted in a brief
Ministers Res. 96(2), 1996 Sess. (Feb. 8, 1996).
92

Russia 's Request, supra note 91,

7 (e.g., "a new criminal code and a code of criminal

procedure; a new civil code and a code of civil procedure; a law on the flmctioning and
administration of the penitentiary system; . . . new laws in line with Council of Europe
standards... on the role, functioning and administration of the Procurator's Office and of the
Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights; for the protection of national minorities; on
freedom of assembly and on freedom of religion; ... the status of the legal profession will be
protected by law: a professional bar association will be established," etc.).
9' Id. 10 (listing, among others, the European Convention on Human Rights; Protocol
No. 6 on the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace; European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; European
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; European Charter of Local
Self-Government; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; studying, with a view
toward ratification, the Council of Europe's Social Charter; signing and ratifying and applying
the basic principles of other Council of Europe conventions-notably those on extradition, on
mutual assistance in criminal matters, on the transfer of sentenced persons, and on the
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime; etc.).
9" See Bowring, supranote 87, at 639-40; Bill Bowring, Russia's Accession to the Council
of Europe and Human Rights: Four Years On, 4 EUR. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 362, 379 (2000)
(noting fears that flagrant Russian non-compliance threatened the integrity of the Strasbourg
system); Jeffrey Kahn, Note, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European
Convention of Human Rights as a Barometerof Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia, 35
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 641, 644 (2002) (questioning whether Russian violations could "bring
the efficacy of this innovative human rights system into doubt, in the process diminishing the
reputation of the Council of Europe as a whole").
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suspension of Russia's voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council, a sensational walkout from that body by the Russian delegation, and
vituperative diplomatic exchanges on both sides.95 Lord Judd, in his report to
the Council, expressed his dismay that the European Court of Human Rights
had been sidelined. "What on earth is the point of having these institutions,"
he said, "if our governments are not prepared to act?... the Council of Europe
is about human rights or it is about nothing."96 The fear was, of course, that
the Council had been played for a fool by the Russians and that, as a result, its
own credibility and effectiveness had been undermined not just in Russia but
in other countries and subject areas.
Thus, when the Council was considering Russia's initial request for
membership, the Parliamentary Assembly expressed its opinion on the first
Chechen War, raging at the time: "The Chechen conflict cannot be resolved by
the use of force. There will be no peace in the region, nor an end to terrorist
attacks, without a political solution based on negotiation and on European
democratic values."97 It appears, at least for now, that the Assembly was
wrong. The rebels have been either co-opted or killed. Grozny is slowly being
rebuilt.9"
The tragic irony is that the Assembly should have been right. Chechnya's
reconstruction is now overseen by a maniac, Ramzan Kadyrov, who has been
given a free hand by Moscow to run Chechnya more or less as a fiefdom so

" The Assembly's actions are summarized in Eur. Parl. Assembly, Credentials of the
Delegation of the Russian Federation, Opinion ofthe Comm. onLegalAff. and Hum. Rts., 2001
Sess., Doc. No. 8956 (2001), available athttp://assembly.coe.intlmain.asp?Link=/documents/w
orkingdocs/doc0l/edoc8956.htm. For unofficial transcripts and summaries of the debates, see
Eur. Parl. Assembly, Provisional Version of the Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 10
A.M. [hereinafter April 2000 Debate], availableat http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Do
cuments/Records/2000/E/000206 1OOOE.htm (last visited June 2,2008), and Eur. Parl. Assembly,
Provisional Version ofthe Report ofthe Debate of06 April 2000 at 15 P.M [sic], available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Records/2000/E/0002061500E.htm.
96 April 2000 Debate, supra note 95.
97 Russia 's Request, supra note 91,
4.
98 See Chivers, supra note 46; see also Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights on
His Visit to the Chechen Republic ofthe Russian Federation, supra note 69, VI ("It is equally
evident that a certain economic revival is taking place. It is possible to see many new and
reconstructed houses and much building going on particularly outside of Grozny, markets
springing up, cafes, petrol stations, restaurants and shops opening up; there is traffic and bustle
in the streets. Local NGOs are establishing themselves. Unemployment, however, remains
extremely high, particularly for the young, and a number of buildings, streets and infrastructures
remain to be restored. Corruption remains rife, affecting even the compensation money for the
reconstruction of destroyed property.").
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long as he can keep what is euphemistically called order. The Council was
utterly ineffectual in stopping the violence or even moderating it. As a result,
the Council of Europe had as a member a country that had entirely cordoned
off a section of its population and its territory from the rule of law and other
core values of the Council.
In addition to Chechnya, there have been many other failures. Russia, for
example, has not ratified Protocol No. 6 to the Convention abolishing the death
penalty, although its presidential moratorium on executions has continued
since Yeltsin decreed it.99 With France's recent abolition of the death penalty
under all circumstances, Russia is now the only member of the Council of
Europe not to have ratified either Protocol 6 or Protocol 13.10 The deadline
° Other states have been subject to
for this commitment expired in 1999. 10
sanctions for less blatant disregard of the obligations of membership. But to
the chagrin of many, Russia has often appeared to thumb its nose at the
Council with one hand, while the other hand has rested gently on the spigot of
a natural gas pipeline or two.
The strains to the credibility of the Council of Europe political system
caused by Russian membership would have been bad enough. But the Council
has also suffered great strain to its judicial system by expanding the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to include Russia. Russia
is the only member-state to have failed to ratify Protocol 14, which the
Commissioner for Human Rights called an act of sabotage against the
European Court of Human Rights.l0 2 This protocol, which can only enter into
" See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death
=
Penalty, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT I14&CM=8&DF=4/6/
2008&CL=ENG (last visited June 2, 2008).
"0Terry Davis, Sec'y Gen. of the Council of Eur., Speech at the Conference Marking the
First European Day Against the Death Penalty (Oct. 9, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.
coe.int/t/dc/press/news/20071009_disc sgEN.asp?). Protocol 13 to the Convention concerns
the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, including with respect to acts committed
in time of war or of imminent threat of war, which are not excluded by Protocol 6.
, See Russia's Request, supra note 91, 10(ii).
102 Thomas Hammarberg:Russia WitnessingPositive TrendsIn ProtectionOfHuman Rights,
Oct. 4,2007, http://news.rin.ru/eng/news/10948 ("The State Duma's refusal to ratify
Protocol 14 was viewed at the Council of Europe as sabotage against the European Court of
Human Rights, Hammarberg told Russian journalists in Strasbourg on Thursday."). See Eur.
Parl. Assembly, Report of the 31st Sitting of the ParliamentaryAssembly, 2 Oct. 2007, 3
P.M, 2007 Sess., Doc. No. AACR 31, at Remarks of Mr. Margelov (2007), availableat http://
assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=-/Documents/Records/2007/E/0710021500E.htm ("The Russian
Government was timely in introducing a draft law relating to ratification in the State Duma, the
INTERFAX,
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force upon ratification of all member states, would unplug a huge bottleneck
in the docket of the Court that Russia is largely responsible for creating. 1"3
Russia accounts today for more than one-fourth of the Court's docket and
has also led the league tables in volume of petitions submitted to the Court for
several years."° Last year, over 50,000 applications were lodged with the
Court, over 10,000 of them from Russia. 10 5 That makes Russia the single
largest source of petitions to the Court out of the forty-seven member-states to
the Convention.0 6 This is an extraordinary achievement for Russia, and an
unhappy one for everyone else.10 7 The most recent proof in point is the Court's
judgment in the case of Babushkin v. Russia.108 The Court held that
Babushkin, a convict serving a sentence for aggravated violent robbery in
Nizhny Novgorod, had been subjected to conditions of detention that violated

lower House of the Russian Parliament, but the relevant committee in the Duma made a terrible
mistake in preventing that law even from being considered."). The Duma failed to ratify the
protocol last fall bya vote of27-113. Steve Gutterman, HeadofEuropeanHumanRightsCourt
Seeks Russian Approval of Stalled Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 10, 2007 (reprinted in
JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, #107, May 11, 2007). For a recent speech by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel on the subject, see Angela Merkel, Ger. Chancellor, Speech to the Eur. Parl.
Assembly, Spring session (Apr. 15,2008), availableathttp://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/pa-session/
april 2008/20080415 disc merkelen.asp ("I hope that in the new Duma the time has now come
to look at Additional Protocol 14 again from a different perspective and secure ratification by
Russia. I would welcome that very much, as it would be in everyone's interest.").
103 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, Art. 19, opened for signature
May 13, 2004, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/194.htm. For a
more critical view of the reform, see Patricia Egli, ProtocolNo. 14 to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms: Towards a More Effective
Control Mechanism?, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2007).
104 REGISTRY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2006,
at 3, 51 (2007). As of December 31, 2007, Russia had more than twice the number of allocated
cases pending against it (20,296) than its nearest competitor, Turkey (9,173). REGISTRY OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2007, at 53 (2008). By
comparison, with the exception of Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Romania, all other memberstates had fewer than 3,200 cases pending against it. Id.Russia also had the most applications
submitted to the Court in 2003, 2004, and 2005. See REGISTRY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HuMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTwITIES 2005, at 34-35 (2006).
105SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2006, supra note 104, at 38, 40.
106 Id.

107 This

is especially so for a Court that, according to its former President, receives

approximately 900 letters and 250 international phone calls each day, and whose website
registered fifty-seven million "hits" in 2005. Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court ofHuman
Rights: The Past, The Present, The Future, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 521, 527 (2007).
108App. No. 67253/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
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the Article 3 prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment., 9 But, as a result
of the bottleneck to the Court's docket for which Russia is primarily
responsible, the alleged violation occurred almost eight years ago." 0
This docket backlog affects all member states. The egregious nature of
violations to the Convention committed on the eastern extreme of the Court's
jurisdiction make serious violations committed on the western side of Europe
appear comparatively less serious, thus slackening overall protections as a
result. This has been the burden placed on all of Europe by Russia's
membership.
As justified as these complaints are, Russian acceptance of the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Human Rights has been so important to the
development of the rule of law in Russia that, on balance, and assuming that
some resolution of the current docket crisis can be found, the risks were worth
taking. The Court has the power to rule on the merits of admissible petitions
by anyone who alleges a violation by Russia of his or her rights guaranteed
under the Convention. 1 ' And because the Court assesses a violation in
virtually every case by undertaking a close examination of Russian domestic
law for compliance with the Convention, everyjudgment is a recipe for further
reform. What is more, the rights secured by the Convention read like a laundry
list of democratic and rule-of-law principles, including rights to life, liberty,
privacy, free expression and association, religious freedom, and prohibitions
against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, discrimination,
involuntary commitment and unlawful detention." 2 Russia has committed
itself to all of these prescriptions.
That commitment, of course, was made at a rather general and abstract level
at the time of ratification. As Russia has lost specific case after specific case
in Strasbourg, Russia has repeatedly cried foul or worse. Mis-, mal-, and
nonfeasance has taken many forms. With regard to one case, Ilascu et al. v.
Moldova & Russia,' the Russian Representative to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe was instructed by his government simply
not to participate in the Committee's examination of the execution of the
'09Id. Even the abominable conditions that the Court found Babushkin to have endured led
to only a modest award of C2500. Id.
10 See id. Note that Babuskin entered into the ECHR system in 2001 and the case was not
decided until late 2007.
. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
arts. 32, 34, 41, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
112 Id.
113 App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004).
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judgment of the European Court. 14 In several of the Chechen cases before the
Court, the Government has refused to submit documents requested by the
Court."1 5 And a leader of the Russian human rights bar in Strasbourg, Karina6
Moskalenko, has been subjected to trumped up disbarment hearings."
Russian politicians have also been tempted to claim victim status. Last
January, Putin accused the Court of "politicisation" of its judgments against
Russia." 7 And Sergei Baburin, former deputy speaker of the Duma,
complained that Russia's membership fees simply fund "attacks" on Russia by
the Council of Europe." 8
That is hard to swallow when one looks at the cases Russia has lost. These
are hardly close calls or political questions. The Chechen cases are the most
harrowing, and several have already been mentioned. But they are a very small

114The Representative described the judgment of the Court as "inconsistent, controversial,

subjective, politically and legally wrong and based on double standards." The case involved the
arrest, trial, inhumane treatment, and torture of individuals by the so-called Moldavian Republic
of Transdniestria. Although Russia has paid the just satisfaction sums awarded by the Court, it
has refused to comply with the Court's direction to both Russia and Moldova to release the two
applicants who remain in custody. Wildhaber, supra note 107, at 530-32. The Court has also
found, on occasion, that Russian officials have hindered the work of the Court through the
harassment of applicants seeking redress before the Court or through repeated failures to submit
documents requested by the Court. See, e.g., Popov v. Russia, App. No. 26853/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
246-251 (2006) (holding that officials about whose facility petitioner had complained had
intimidated petitioner with repeated meetings designed to interfere with his petition to the Court
in Strasbourg in violation of ECHR Art. 34); Fedotova v. Russia, App. No. 73225/01, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
45-52 (2006) (holding that inquiry into payment of taxes by petitioner's translator,
which followed application to the Court by petitioner for just satisfaction and that was conducted
not by the competent tax authority but by the local police amounted to "an interference with the
exercise of the applicant's right of individual petition and incompatible with the respondent
State's obligation under Article 34 of the Convention").
115 See, e.g., Imakayeva v. Russia, App. No. 7615/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
119, 142 (2007)
(explaining "[t]he Government refused to disclose any documents which could shed light on the
fate of the applicant's son and husband and did not present any plausible explanation concerning
their alleged detention or subsequent fate. In view of this patent denial of cooperation, the Court
is obliged to take a decision on the facts of the case with the materials available."). The Court
attributed liability for the presumed death of the individual to the State. Id.
116Peter Finn, Russia's Champion of Hopeless Cases is Targetedfor Disbarment, WASH.
POST, June 2, 2007, at A16; Gutterman, supra note 102. The allegation was Kafka-esque:
Moskalenko allegedly failed to provide adequate representation to one of her clients, Mikhail
Khordorkovsky. She is one of twelve lawyers for Khodorkovsky that have been subjected to
disbarment proceedings, often on trumped up or otherwise flimsy grounds. Finn, supra.
"' Umarova & Aldamova, supra note 71.
118 Id.
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fraction of the cases heard by the Court."

9

Much more common are cases

recounting torturous police interrogation or abusive practices; 2 ' lengthy, 12'
undocumented, 22 or inhumane detention in conditions that have improved little
since a United Nations special rapporteur ultimately gave up trying to describe
them, stating that he would need "the poetic skills of a Dante or the artistic
23
skills of a Bosch adequately to describe the infernal conditions" he found;
gross failures of process in criminal or civil cases; arbitrary or bad-faith
or ethnic groups; 124 property
bureaucratic actions against disfavored religious
25
on.
and
on
rights violations; and the list goes
Russia set aside I 10 million rubles (US$4.2 million) to pay thesejudgments
last year."' That is an eleven fold increase from 2003.127 On its face, that is
hardly a good indicator that the rule of law has improved under Putin. It also
reflects the anticipated volume of cases expected, since even in the most
egregious cases, the damages ordered by the Court are almost offensively small

ACTIVITIES 2007, supra note 104, at 59 (chart of violations by article showing
fair trial and property cases to far outnumber combined number of cases concerning the right to
life, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and liberty/security issues).
120 See, e.g., Mikheyev v. Russia, App. No. 77617/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) (describing nine
119 SURVEY OF

days of police torture that the petitioner alleged to have included beatings, threats, and the
application of electric shocks, following which the applicant attempted suicide through
defenestration); see also Sheydayev v. Russia, App. No. 65859/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
2' Khudoyorov v. Russia, App. No. 6847/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); Kalashnikov v. Russia,
App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 587 (2002).
122 Belevitskiy v. Russia, App. No. 72967/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Menesheva v. Russia,
App. No. 59261/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
123 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Hum. Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/37,
Addendum, Visit by the Special Rapporteur to the Russian Federation, 71, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/34/Add. 1 (Nov. 16, 1994) (describing the Butyrskaya and Matrosskaya Tishina
No. 1 remand centres in Moscow). See, e.g., Khudoyorov, App. No. 6847/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006).
124 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 72881/01, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006); Timishev v. Russia, App. Nos. 55762/00 & 55974/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
25 The first judgment against Russia was Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00, 38 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 639 (2002), which found a violation of Article 6(1) and Article 1 of Protocol No. I to the
Convention in the failure of the Russia judicial system to enforce its civil judgment in Burdov's
favor for lack of payment of his state pension. See infra note 129. Protection of Property
was the second highest category of judgments against Russia in 2007. See SURVEY
OF ACTIVITIEs 2007, supra note 104, at 59.
126 Umarova & Aldamova, supra note 71.
127 Id.
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in consideration
of the human rights violations for which they are supposed to
128
compensate.
On the other hand, one fact is unassailable. As has already been noted,
malfeasance has taken many forms. But one form that Russia has not dared to
take has been a refusal to recognize the legitimacy of ajudgment of the Court.
Russia has paid every, single judgment assessed against it, without exception.
This is a feat worth noting, and it is to be attributed solely to Vladimir Putin,
since the first judgment against Russia was not handed down until
Russia's representatives appear to take their legal
May 2002.129
responsibilities to represent Russia at the Court very seriously, for even when
they refuse documents or complain about the Court, they do so in legal filings
and oral arguments. In other words, political rhetoric notwithstanding, the
Court commands the respect of the Russian leadership. And it is apparent-in
Russia's obstructionism, if nothing else-that these repeated losses sting.
Why do they sting? Because Russia, its institutions and leaders, like, want,
and need a self-conception and outward impression of being a rule-of-law
state. Because, as with less successful human rights instruments that preceded
the Strasbourg system, shaming effects have a surprising power on states.
By way of example and conclusion, a summary of a case recently handed
down by the Court nicely encapsulates these points. The case is styled
Nasrulloyev v. Russia. 30 Nasrulloyev was a Tadzhik who had fallen on the
wrong side of the current regime in Tadzhikistan and fled to Moscow.' 3' He

2'

For example, four days of continuous beatings at the hands of five police officers followed

by attempted sodomization with a bottle, which ended the violence by eliciting a signed
confession, was compensated with 620,000 in non-pecuniary damages, plus any applicable taxes
and simple interest. Sheydayev v. Russia, App. No. 65859/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). Nearly five
years of pre-trial detention in inhumane conditions was deemed compensable with 68,000.
Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 587 (2002). The disappearance of
the petitioner's son and husband at the hands of Russian authorities, which was found to work
multiple violations of Arts. 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 & 38 of the Convention was deemed compensated with
C90,000 plus costs. Imakayeva v. Russia, App. No. 7615/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
129 Burdov, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 639. This was also the first application declared admissible
against Russia. Id. Burdov was a pensioner awarded state compensation for services rendered
during the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Burdov fought a long-running legal battle to receive his
unpaid compensation that was unsuccessful until the European Court began to act on his
petition. In compensation for the violation of his right to a fair trial and property interest in his
pension, a violation that Russia worked by failing to guarantee execution of Burdov's court
judgment, the European Court awarded Burdov £3,000. Id.
130 App. No. 656/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
131 Id.
6-1 1.
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was arrested there on a request for extradition to Tashkent. 13 2 The legal
question before the Court concerned the legality and length of Nasrulloyev's
detention pending extradition, which lasted three years.' 33 Russia, as usual,
lost the case and has been ordered to pay Nasrulloyev over C4 1,000 in nonpecuniary damages and costs.' 34 There can be no doubt that Russia will pay.
But more interesting than the outcome was Russia's fairly typical behavior
in the run-up to judgment. The Russian government fought this case from its
lowest level court to the Russian Constitutional Court and throughout
proceedings in Strasbourg, on legal and factual grounds. But Nasrulloyev's
lawyer, Karinna Moskalenko, feared that Russia would extradite him before
the case could be heard in Strasbourg. 35 She notified the European Court and
sought interim measures to protect him from extradition to a country with an
even worse human rights record than the one he was in.' 36 Within sixteen days
of Russia's announced intention to extradite Nasrulloyev, the European Court
received Moskalenko's request for interim protection, ruled on it,
communicated the ruling to Moscow, and received assurances from the
Russian Government that the domestic authorities had been informed of the
Court's order not to extradite until further notice.'37 There were no legal tricks
or shenanigans after that.
It gets better. A few days after receipt of the order had been confirmed, the
Moscow City Court overruled the prosecutor's decision to extradite the
applicant, holding that the Tajikistan Government had not furnished the
requisite guarantees concerning the fair trial and subsequent treatment of
Nasrulloyev.' 38 The Russian Court then applied Tadzhik law to conclude that
Nasrulloyev was eligible for amnesty under a general amnesty law that
The
rendered any subsequent prosecution of him politically motivated. 39
40
appeal.
on
findings
court's
lower
the
upheld
Court
Supreme
Russian

Id. 14.
62, 79. In addition, Nasrulloyev alleged that extradition could result in his torture
and execution, violations of the Convention. Id. 57. The Court held this complaint to be
inadmissible. Id. 1 61.
134 Id. at Statement of Judgment 11 1-5.
135 Id. 11 39-40.
136 Id.
137 Id.
39-42.
138 Id. 143.
139 id. 144.
43-47 (2007).
140 Nasrulloyev v. Russia, App. No. 656/06, Eur. Ct. H.R.
132

133 Id. 11
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One can take away from this case that Russian justice only works when a
harsh, outside light is shined on it. That would hardly be a complete
misperception, as it surely works better under those circumstances and it is
hard to escape the conclusion that the Strasbourg Court's order was the "but
for" cause of his liberation. But one should also conclude that Russia takes the
Strasbourg system seriously, complies with Court orders or defends its refusals
to do so in court filings, pays its judgments, and has the capacity to do far more
justice through its laws than Russia is usually given credit. What is more, the
Strasbourg system only "worked" in this instance (as in many instances) by
applying Russianlaw found in the caselaw ofthe Russian Constitutional Court
and in the Criminal Procedure Code to conclude that Nasrulloyev had been
held unlawfully, and for an unlawfully long time, in detention.
C. Codificationand the CriminalProcedure Code
A third window is opened by close scrutiny of some of the laws Russia has
passed. "It would not be unfair," observed a distinguished scholar of Russian
Law, Ferdinand Feldbrugge, to say at least that the last years of Yeltsin's
presidency were "characterised by a bare-faced political opportunism and the
absence of serious efforts to adopt any long-term strategy."'4 1 As a result, he
observed, legal developments in this period were mixed.' 42 On the one hand,
there was codification, especially in the realm of private law: a code of
arbitration procedure (1992 & 1995), parts one and two of the Civil Code
(1994 & 1996), the Family Code (1995), the Criminal Code (1996), and the
Tax Code (1998), along with codes of lesser importance. On the other hand,
as I have already mentioned, a sense of lawlessness was pervasive, and the end
of the Communist Party's control of property and capital was largely
conducted like a rigged fire sale.'43
The volume of codification and re-codification of law during the Putin
administration in the first term alone, on the other hand, was staggering. There
was part two of the Tax Code (2000), the Land Code (2001), part three of the
Civil Code (2001), the Criminal Procedure Code (2001), the Labor Code
(2001), the Administrative Violations Code (2001), the Arbitration Code
(2002), the Civil Procedure Code (2002), the Customs Code (2003), and the

141 Ferdinand

Feldbrugge, The Rule of Law in Russia in a European Context, in RUSSIA,

EUROPE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 203, 208 (Ferdinand Feldbrugge ed., 2007).
142

Id.

143

See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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Housing Code (2004). There are many good reasons to be pleased with these
legal reforms. Tax reform, for example, has contributed to a better business
climate and more predictability for both the state and society.'" It has also led
to an upward tick4 5in the percentage of legally obtained income reported by
Russian citizens.1
There are many different codes and much could be said about each one of
them. But the most constructive reform of the Putin years, the most important
of these codification and re-codification projects, the one with the most direct
effect on the liberty of members of society, and the one with the potential for
the most lasting effect on the rule of law is the reform of the criminal justice
system. It is potentially the reform that could be Putin's lasting legacy. This
is saying a lot to describe a man who, according to Lilia Shevtsova, used his
position as head of the FSB to spirit his former boss Anatoly Sobchak out of
Russia ahead of a corruption investigation (thus, in her words, helping "a
witness and potential suspect escape justice") and who presided over the
institution that released scandalous kompromat of46questionable authenticity
against former Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov.
Russia's new Criminal Procedure Code works a sea change in the law of
criminal procedure (that is, the law that governs one's rights from the moment
one is suspected of a crime to the last appeal). 14' There is much about the new
Russian system that is, as provided on the books at least, an improvement on
procedure in the United States and Western Europe. For example, the Code
permits a police officer to arrest a person only "on suspicion of having
committed a crime for which incarceration is a potential penalty. '"'4 8 This
limitation should be contrasted with jurisdictions, like many states in the
United States, in which an arrest is permitted even for offenses that could
never result in a jail term.'4 9 Another example is the absolute exclusion of

Fedyukin, supra note 37.
4 Id. ("The percentage of legal earnings as part of the Russian's total income is growing:
in 2000 legal earning made up 38.2% of a Russian's income, where as today it makes up 48%,
according to RMES [the Russian Monitor of the Economic Situation and Public Health].").
146 SHEVTSOVA, supra note 32, at 32-33 & 278 n.l 1.
'

141 See

YronoBHo-npoueccyanabHbir KoaeKc Pocchcoii 4DegepatuH [Criminal Procedure

Code], Federal Law No.174-FZ, signed December 18, 2001 (as amended through
December 30, 2006) [hereafter CrPC] (all English translations of the Code herein are taken from
the translation prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2004. The primary editors were
Vasiliy Vlasihin, Lead Research Fellow, the Institute of U.S. and Canada, Russian Academy of
Sciences, and Professor William Burnham of Wayne State University School of Law.).
148 Id. art. 91(1).
141See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (upholding arrest of driver

[Vol. 36:511

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

confessions obtained outside the presence of a lawyer. 5 ° If counsel was not
present when the defendant confessed to the police, the confession is
inadmissible at trial if repudiated by the defendant, including a defendant who
had waived his right to counsel. This is designed to decrease police
brutality). 5 ' Such a strict exclusionary rule is found in Italy, but not elsewhere
in Western Europe.'52
Even where the Code does not surpass Western European or American
practices, it often meets them. The old Soviet code, for example, granted the
power to order pretrial detention to the procurator.' 5 3 The new Code at last
implements a provision of the 1993 Constitution (Art. 22(2)) that provides that
"no person may be detained for more than 48 hours" without a "judicial
54
order"--a command that now must come from a judge, not a prosecutor.
The same reversal has been done for the power to issue warrants to search a
home or seize personal papers.'
Here, again, Russian membership in the Council of Europe has worked
benefits.' 56 Initially, the drafters of the Code feared that the judicial system
was not yet ready to handle the additional work, so they inserted a proviso
delaying the effects of the new detention portions of the Code until 2004. 15
But the Russian Constitutional Court held the delaying provisions
unconstitutional in a 2002 decision issued just a few months before the
effective date of the new Code.' 58 The Court not only relied on the "direct

for failure to secure small child with a seatbelt, a misdemeanor offense punishable only by fine);
see also Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008) (upholding against Fourth Amendment
challenge an arrest for driving with a suspended license that, although based on probable cause,
was not an arrestable offense under state law).
150CrPC art. 75(2).
' William Burnham& Jeffrey Kahn, Russia's CriminalProcedureCode Five Years Out, 33
REV. CENT. & E. EuR. L. 1,39-40 (2008).
152 STEPHEN

C.

THAMAN,

COMPARATIVE

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE:

A

CASEBOOK

APPROACH 82-83 (2002).

153See Yro.roaHo-npoueccyanhHhlii KoiteKC PC)CP, BejtoMocT BepxonHoro CoBeTa
(1960), X2 40, ct. 593, arts. 11, 89, 96, 97 (as amended through Dec. 29, 2001).
114See CrPC, arts. 10(1), 29(2), 91(2), 94(2)-(3), 101(1), 107(2), 108(7).
...CrPC arts. 155, 182(2)-(3), 186; see also Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151.
116The Code of Criminal Procedure was largely catalyzed by Russia's quest to join the
Council of Europe, whose standards for arrest, detention, and trial Russia had to satisfy. A wide
variety of European and American legal experts were consulted in its drafting and
implementation. See Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151.
157 Kahn, supra note 94, at 667-68.
1s lIocranoaHinene KoncmruyUHoHHoro Cyia P4' OT 14 mapxa 2002 r. N 6-1- "Ho aeny o

nponepze KOHCTHTyuHoRHHOT

cTaTeIi90, 96, 122 H216 YronoaHo-npoueccyabhooro

Ko]tezca
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effect" of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, but also observed that since the
Constitution was ratified, Russia had taken on the additional obligation of
implementing the European Convention.' 59
In addition to stripping prosecutors of the power to order pre-trial detention,
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code, in
March 2001 and October 2002, respectively, limited the types of crimes for
which someone could be detained. 6 ' Cases in which investigators requested
pre-trial detention decreased from 144,000 in the first half of 2000 to 66,000
in the first half of 2003-an almost 220% decrease. 161
Witnesses, suspects, and defendants now have greater rights than ever
before. This is particularly so with respect to the right to counsel, which
attaches to more participants in the criminal justice system at an earlier stage
of proceedings than ever before. Prior to being questioned for the first time,
the new Code spells out that a suspect is entitled "to have a one-on-one
meeting with [counsel] in a confidential setting."'162 Someone accused of a
crime, rather than merely suspected of it, is entitled to an "unlimited number
of one-on-one meetings of unlimited duration in a confidential setting with
defense counsel."'

163

One of the more abstract, but critically important changes in the Code is the
adoption of adversarial principles. The old Soviet Code was a calcified
version of continental European practices that provided for an exclusive state
investigation into criminal wrongdoing and a trial that largely revolved around

PCDCP B CBAI3H c

Kajno6aMH

rpawnaH C.C.MaieHKHHa, P.H.MapTbHOBa H C.B.HycTOBanoBa,"

ConP. 3AKOH., 25 Mapra 2002, N 12, ct. 1178.
' Id. Direct effect of constitutional rights and freedoms is imposed by Art. 18 of the

Constitution. The Convention provisions at issue were the third and fourth clauses of Article 5
of the Convention concerning prompt and exclusivelyjudicialoversight of pretrial detention in
pursuit of a trial within a reasonable time.
16 The March 2001 change in the old Code permitted detention only ifthe crime charged was
punishable by over two years imprisonment (up from one year) and the amendment to the
Criminal Code, effective October 2002, reduced the maximum punishment for simple theft to
two years or less. That eliminated an entire class of crime from potential pre-trial detention.
161See Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151, at 18 (citing "bopllc FaBpnoB, Hoae,7bl
5, 6
yozo7oeHozo npoiyecca Ha IPoue KpuMuNaabnou cmamucmuKu, 10 POCCIRACKA IOCTHI4
(2003) [Boris Gavrilov, New Features of the Criminal Process in Statistics, 10 ROssIISKAIA
IUSTiTSIiA 5, 6 (2003).]).
162 CrPC, art. 46(4)(3). The Code provides that the meeting may not be limited to less than
two hours, even if the suspect is needed to participate in investigative actions. Id. art. 92(4).
163 Id. art. 47(4)(9). An arrested suspect must be questioned within twenty-four hours of the
point of his actual arrest, id. art. 46(2), while an accused must be questioned "immediately after
presenting the charges." Id. art. 173(1).
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a case file or dossier compiled by the state's investigator. 6 The Soviet
version of this approach to criminal justice ostensibly undertook to compile a
"complete and objective" case file, 65 but in reality blurred the responsibilities
of the prosecution and the court.
The new Code works a 180 degree turnaround from Soviet practice,
providing that: "A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution and shall not
take the prosecution or defense side in a case. The court shall create the
conditions necessary for the parties to perform their procedural duties and to
exercise the rights granted to them.' 6 6 Thus, the prosecutor has been stripped
of his judicial powers to issue warrants, as previously noted. The state has
formally lost its monopoly on gathering evidence for trial, a responsibility it
presented
must now share with the defense. Evidence is now expected to be 67
cross-examination.
by
followed
sides,
both
from
witnesses
by live
This change is most visible when it comes to jury trials, which the Code has
returned to Russia after an absence of seventy-five years. 68 Once limited to
a select few provinces, jury trials are now available everywhere in Russia
except Chechnya 69 Last year, jury trials accounted for 13.7% of subject-level
court cases, up from 11.9% in 2005.170 Statistics confirm the jury's
164 See generally PavAen BTopoi, YroonBHo-npoueccya.iHairi KoteKc PC4CP (1960); see

also id. art. 213(3) (investigator to conduct an "objective and complete" investigation of all
sides); see also Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151, at 25-28.
165Pa3ilen BTOpOr1, YronoBHo-npoiueccyarbHhlir Ko teKc PC()CP art. 213(3).
166CrPC, art. 15(3).
1671 have noted elsewhere the deep structural problems in combining such adversarial and

common-law approaches to the collection and presentation of evidence with the continental
European case file or dossier approach that Russia has retained. See Jeffrey Kahn, Adversarial
Principlesand the Case File in Russian CriminalProcedure,in THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND
RuSsIA (Katlijn Malfliet & Ria Laenen eds., forthcoming 2008); see also Burnham & Kahn,
supra note 151.
168Burnham & Kahn, supranote 151, at 75.

169The delay of their introduction in Chechnya was upheld as constitutional by the
Constitutional Court. HlocTaHOBneHHe KOHcrHTytUHOHHOrO CyiaP4 OW6 anpenm 2006 r. N 3-I
"Ho gteny o npoBepKe KOHCTHTyUHOHHOCTH OT/tejibHbIX nonloKeHH9 6DegepaamHoro
KOHCTHy4HOHHOrO 3aKOHa "0 BoeHH, X cyAax PoccricKOr (DetepauHH," 43eaepanbHbix
3aKOHOB "0 npncsxobLX 3acei iaenAx 4egepaabHbx cyAoa o6Iuer IOPHCHKUHH BPOCCH&cKOr

6DeepaUiHH," " 0 BBeHHH B AeerTBHe YronoBHo-npoueccyamHoro ojerca POCCHACKOii
c
6DegepauHH" H YronoaHo-npoueccyamHoro Koiierca POCCHrICKOi DeAepaiuHn B CBAS3H
3anpocom lpe3nHaerra qeqeHcKoHi Pecny6riniH,
xcano6ori rpaataHKH K.F. Ty6ypoaor4 H
3anpocom Ceaepo-KaBKascKoro oIpyXCnoro BoeHHoro cyxIa," Co;P. 3AKOH., 17 anpena 2006,
N 16, ct. 1775.
'70 For statistics see, The Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian

Federation, http://www.cdep.n/material.asp?material-id=217 (last visited June 2, 2008).
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independence. While the non-jury acquittal rate has traditionally been
17 2
below 1%,'1 the acquittal rate forjuries ran around 20% for the first cases. 173
The rate dropped in 2000 and 2001 to around 15%, and in 2002 to 8.5%.
But in more recent years, it has returned to its former levels, with a 22% rate
for 2006.174
One must take great care in describing the Code's remarkable reforms to
make clear that what is required by law does not always reflect what transpires
on the ground. My own field research, as well as anecdotal reports from
others, confirms that the reality is much grimmer than these wonderful paper
changes. What one sees in the average Russian courtroom (let alone police
precinct house) is a far, far cry from what one might imagine from an academic
reading of the code books. But that is a predictable conclusion, even if it is
based only on the sheer volume and nature of petitions brought before the
European Court, the very court whose caselaw and Convention mandate helped
to catalyze the Russian reform in the first place. The ever increasing ranks of
competent counsel can now provide solid defenses for clients accused of nonpolitical crimes. But most Russians cannot afford counsel,' 75 and even now,
many counsel are far from competent. 76 There are still several generations of
171 The reported acquittal rate in 2002 in trials in district courts, where there is no right to a
The acquittal rate in district courts in 2006
jury trial, was 0.71%. POCCI4f1cKA l iOcTmi.t.
was 0.5%. See O63op )xeATeirbHOCTH (eaepaiAbHbIX cy aB o6ux IOPHCAHKHRHH 1HMHpOBbIX
cyzei 3a 12 Mecsuen 2006 r., Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, http://www.cdep.ru/uploaded-files/statistics/aHaH3%20craTcTM%02012 20Mec
%202006r.xml (last visited June 2, 2008).
172 See Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151, at 76, n.375 (citing Stephen Thaman, The
Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT'LL. 61,270-71 (1995)).
173 For reviews for 1997-2001 and 2002, see Burnham & Kahn, supra note 151, at 76, n.376;
Cyoe6naA cmamucmuKa 3a nepeoe noyoOue 2002 sooa, POCCHWICKAA IOCTHI.[USI 2003, N 1.
174 Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, supra note 170.
171 Russia's human rights commissioner, Vladimir Lukin, identified a growing rich-poor gap

as Russia's primary social problem in 400-page report on human rights. Russian Human Rights
Ombudsman Release 2006 Report, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 16, 2007. Vladimir
Putin made the same point on October 18, 2007, and stated that the growing middle class
represents a big challenge for Russia. Putin Says FightingPoverty in Russia is His Greatest
Challenge,BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 18,2007 (Transcript ofRTRRossiya television
broadcast 0800GMT, Oct. 18, 2007) ("The most difficult [task] has certainly been fighting
poverty. I have to point out, however, that we are consistently tackling this problem. Today it
is not just about fighting poverty. Today it is about changing the situation in which we have a
very great disparity between the incomes of those citizens of Russia whom we regard as rich and
those whom we regard as low-income citizens.").
176See generally EacMaHHoe npaBocy iHe: ypou4 caMoo6opOHbl. loco6ne xi aJBOKaToB:
npo'rr Hnepeta jtpyroMy (KapHHHa MocKaneHKo HAeoH 4 HHKHTHHCKHri, pea. 2004).
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police, prosecutors,judges and defense lawyers who were trained under the old
regime. They have all staunchly resisted these reforms. But they are
increasingly being displaced by a new cadre of younger professionals with
institutional and ideological investments in the new system that should give
one hope. Thus it is worth keeping Bagehot's cautionary words in mind.177
Some comments should be made in conclusion regarding the state's
willingness to ignore Code provisions in political cases. How do we reconcile
the positive effects of such reforms in run-of-the-mill cases with the
destructive effects of the transparently political machinations that trump these
reforms in high-profile cases? As Feldbrugge himself points out, "[o]ne of the
intriguing features of the politico-legal scene in Russia over the last decade has
been that political struggles were often fought out in the criminal courts."' 78
They need not have been fought there, of course, as a wide variety of
authoritarian regimes in history have shown. And the use of the courts in this
capacity is hardly new, Soviet "telephone justice" being well-known to all.'79
The short answer is that no such reconciliation is possible. Every time the
system is abused in that way, the system corrodes and respect for the rule of
law weakens. Scientists like Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Danilov have been
convicted of selling state secrets in highly irregular proceedings.'
Political
activists on the internet are charged with "inciting hatred or animosity and
humiliating human dignity" (a violation of Article 282 of the Criminal Code)
when they post critical comments about the police.' Aleksandr Nikitin and
177See BAGEHOT, supra note 31.

"'8Feldbrugge, supra note 141, at 209.
179An instructive example comes earlier, in 1878, in the case of Vera Zasulich, who had
attempted to assassinate the military governor of St. Petersburg, whom she blamed for the
unlawful flogging of a fellow student. The great Russian lawyer, Anatolii Fedorovich Koni,
presided as judge at her jury trial. He was subjected to intense pressure by the regime to ensure
a guilty verdict. Koni pledged only to ensure "the impartial observance of the law," which
infuriated Count Konstantin Palen, the Minister of Justice, who stated: "Indeed, justice,
impartiality! ...but in this accursed affair the government has a right to expect special services
from the court and from you ... [T]here are cases which must be viewed ... politically."
Quotedin WILLIAM G. WAGNER, MARRIAGE, PROPERTY, AND LAW IN LATE IMPERIAL RussiA 8,9
(1994). For Koni's reflections on the case, see A.t. KOHK, H36paHHbie nponMaBegeHnK (A.F.

Koni, [Izbrannieproizvedeniia]Selected Works) Vol. 2 (1959). For similar reflections, see also
Donald Mackenzie Wallace, RussIA ON THE EVE OF WAR AND REVOLUTION 86-87 (Cyril E.

Black, ed. 1961).
IsO See Kahn, supra note 4, at 398.
181 Authorities

Tighten Control over Blog Space, BBC WORLDWIDE MONrrORING,

Apr. 14, 2007 (Translation of Russian Ren TV Television Broadcast on April 12, 2007). See
also Lyudmila Alexandrova, CriminalCase OpenedAgainst UserofRussian InternetMagazine,
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Grigorii Pasko, Mikhail Trepashkin and Larisa Arap, 5 2 are all examples of
how the state has weakened respect for the rule of law by using law as a
political tool to oppress or suppress its opponents. If this continues, the slowly
emerging atmosphere of a new legal culture for Russia will evaporate and the
Criminal Procedure Code will take its place in the Potemkin village of other
paper reforms in Russian history.
A more balanced answer must take into account that the new Criminal
Procedure Code makes it harder, although not impossible, to conduct political
trials. Higher pay for more independentjudges makes it harder to find a venue
in which the regime can be confident of success. An increase in both the
number and level of competency of defense counsel with greater legal powers
at their disposal makes it harder, although not impossible, to convict political
defendants either in a court of law or in the court of public opinion. And while
Putin has engaged in his vendettas, or allowed others to pursue theirs, he has
also continued to support reforms that make it harder for him to do so. Such
behavior is not schizophrenia. It shows a realpolitik side to Putin that is
concededly far better than the alternative, even though one can hardly condone
its immediate results for individual defendants or the attendant risks for the
legal system as a whole. All of his anti-corruption campaigns, counterterrorism measures, and renewed economic empowerment could have been
used to much worse effect for the rule of law.
The most high-profile political case during Putin's term in office was the
show trial of former Yukos chairman Mikhail Khodorkovskii, his business
partners, and some of his lawyers.' 83 Khodorkovskii is now more than halfway
through his original eight-year sentence on charges ranging from tax evasion
to fraud.'84 That an oligarch was convicted of these crimes is not particularly
interesting, although elements of the law's manipulation are still shocking. In
the shifting legal landscape of privatization, it is hard to imagine the rise of an
oligarch with clean hands. What is interesting is the selection of
Khodorkovskii, and Khodorkovskii alone, for prosecution. In a common law
ITAR-TASS (Russ.), Apr. 13, 2007.
182 Lynn Berry, Psych Clinic Releases Russian Activist, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 20, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-08-20-96402573_x.htm (recounting forty-six day
forced hospitalization of member of Garry Kasparov's opposition group); Alex Rodriguez,
Russian Dissidents Called Mentally III, Soviet-era PracticeRevived, Activists Say, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 7, 2007, at Zone c, 1.
83 Sophia Kishkovsky, Parole Unlikely for Jailed Russian Oil Executive, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2007 (noting passage of halfway point in Khodorkovskii's eight-year sentence).
184 Id.
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system like the United Kingdom or the United States, selective prosecution
may be defended as an inevitable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But
Russia claims to operate a system of mandatory prosecution that is closer to
the continental European model.' 85 Russia will, sooner or later, be forced to
respond to the numerous violations of the European Convention alleged in
petitions to the Strasbourg Court by lawyers for Khodorkovskii's criminal
matter and lawyer's for Yukos's civil claims against the Russian state. 16 And
although all of this is cold comfort to the man now imprisoned in eastern
Siberia, the trial of Khodorkovskii did shine a harsh, dissecting light on the
Basmann courthouse in particular, and the legal system in general.
The more light that is shined on the Russian system the better, it seems to
me. The activities of Abramovich, Potanin, Friedman, and others could hardly
have been considered to have raised less suspicion than Khordokovskii's. But
no trials were held, in small part because of the obvious fear that they would
unsettle a jittery post-privatization market, but much more so because of
cronyism. Some oligarchs, who could hardly be considered cronies of the
Kremlin, such as Berezovskii and Gusinskii, were forced into exile. 8 7 And
Gusinskii, himself, before exile suffered a brief period of criminal detention
to scare him into divesting his media holdings to the state.' That was conduct
for which Russia was held accountable in the European Court, but which was
in reality, a pyrrhic victory for Gusinskii. 8 9 In other words, when the state
abuses legal process now, there are multiple legal resources for well-heeled
defendants to shame the state, though not to fully remedy the abuse. That is
a step in the right direction, although a small one.
The latest political case, of course, is one that has not been prosecuted in
any country. That is the case assembled in the United Kingdom by the Crown
Prosecution Service against Andrei Lugovoi for the radioactive murder of

185CrPC, art. 21, entitled "Obligation to Prosecute," requires the pursuit of every case in

which evidence of a crime has come to light.
"6 In fact, the European Court has already handed down a judgment against Russia
concerning one of Khodorkovskii's attorneys, Platon Lebedev, who was also charged and
convicted in parallel proceedings. Lebedev successfully alleged that his detention at various
stages of the criminal proceedings violated several provisions of Article 5 of the Convention.
See Lebedev v. Russia, App. No. 4493/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
187 HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 483, 492.
188 Id.
189 Gusinskii v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17, 281 (2004) (awarding
Gusinskii C88,000 plus tax and interest as compensation for the violation of his Art. 5 rights
caused by his detention, which led to the loss of his media empire).
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Aleksandr Litvinenko in London. 190 In October 2007, the British Ambassador
in Russia, Sir Tony Brenton, offered to buy a plane ticket to London for now
Duma Member Lugovoi, glibly stating that an innocent man had nothing to
fear from a fair trial. 9' No doubt that statement rings true with many, and
there is no reason to believe that a British trial would be anything other than
absolutely fair and procedurally sound.
But that assurance entirely misses the point. British policy statements in
this case risked undermining respect for the rule of law and British credibility
in promoting it. The Russian Constitution sets forth an absolute prohibition
on extraditions of Russian citizens.' 92 That fact was generally ignored or
downplayed by the Foreign Office. One would think that it would be a sound
policy decision not to encourage the Russians to breach their own constitution,
which would set a rather awkward precedent given the concern at the time that
Putin might amend or disregard the constitutional provision that limited his
term in office to two consecutive terms.'9 3 The Kremlin should not be
encouraged to pick and choose which constitutional provisions may be ignored
and which should be followed.
Both Ambassador Brenton and former Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe Daniel Tarschys also pointed to the European Convention on
Extradition, to which Russia is a party.' 94 Professor Tarschys wrote that
Russia's ratification of three treaties on extradition, along with the reservations
and declarations attached to them, "do not seem to vindicate the refusal to
extradite Mr. Lugovoi" and that Russian objections to British extradition
requests "should at any rate be based on these texts rather than on the Russian
constitution."' 95 That would be a very strange reading of the treaty, to which
Russia lodged a declaration attached to its instrument of ratification. 9 6 The

190 Obituary:AlexanderLitvinenko, INDEPENDENT (U.K.),

Nov. 25,2006; SpyDeath:Russia

Blocks Extradition, CNN.CoM, May 22, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/05/
22/uk.spy/index.html.
'91C3p TOHH BpeHTOH, nocon BenHKo6pHTaHno B POCCHH: JlyroaoMy Heqero 6OacThC
cnpaBeitnaBoro cyaa, KomcoMoAbcKaA npaeaa,availableat http://www.kp.ru/daily/23980/744
97 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
192KOHCT. P(I, cTaTbA 6 1(1).
193 KOHCT. P1,
114

cTaTba 81(3).

European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, E.T.S. No. 024, available at http:!!

conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm.
195Daniel Tarschys, Letter to the Editor, Article Opens Door to ExtraditionofLugovoi, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 19, 2007, at 12.
196Declarations and Reservations Contained in the Instrument of Ratification to the European
Treaty on Extradition, Deposited on 10 December 1999, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/
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declaration explicitly stated that, per the Russian Constitution, "a citizen of the
Russian Federation may not be extradited to another State."' 197 In fact, the
treaty expressly provides that "[a] Contracting Party shall have the right to
refuse extradition of its nationals" and makes provision for precisely the sort
of declaration that Russia lodged.'98 The plain meaning of these provisions
seems sufficiently clear such that it is difficult to see how they could be read
to compel action other than that which Russia has already taken. However
factually unsatisfying this interpretation and result is to so many involved, it
is legally correct. There is an American legal saying: bad facts make bad law.
The murder of Litvinenko is replete with bad, even horrible facts, and one may
well be concerned that the rush to take a tough law-and-order stance with
Russia, popular though it may be, will ultimately undermine the respect for the
laws that surround such cases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

It would be an unconscionable omission to close this discussion without a
few remarks about the presidential elections held March 2, 2008, which led to
the election of Dmitrii Anatolevich Medvedev as Russia's third post-Soviet
President.' 99 Many speculated that they would not be held at all. Thus, the

Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=024&CM=8&DF= 10/14/2007&CL=ENG&VL=1.
"' Id. ("With respect to sub-paragraph 'a' of paragraph I of Article 6 of the Convention the
Russian Federation declares that in accordance with Article 61 (part I) of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation a citizen of the Russian Federation may not be extradited to another State.").
198 European Convention on Extradition, supra note 194, art. 6(1)(a).
199The Federal Central Election Commission reported the official results ofthe election. The
Commission announced that out ofover 74.7 million voters participating, Dmitrii Medvedev had
won over 52.5 million votes, or 70.28%. nlocTaHoaneHae IeHTpanbHaA I436HparebHaA
KoMCCHA PoccHricKOi (DegepatH <O pecynbTaTax Bb16opoB Hpe3IAteHTa PoccHnIcKoii
cIegepauHn,>> 2 104/777-5, 7 mapTa 2008 r., availableat http://www.cikrf.ru/postancik/Zp08
0777.jsp. Both the conduct of the election campaign and the election itself were subject to fierce
criticism by Russian and international analysts. A delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe criticized the presidential campaign and election both before and after the
polls held on March 2, 2008. See Press Release, PACE Pre-Election Delegation Concerned By
Limited Choice in Russian Presidential Election, Feb. 8, 2008, availableat http://assembly.coe.
int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2008 ("An election where candidates are confronted with
almost insurmountable difficulties when trying to register risks not qualifying as free. An
election where there is not a level playing field for all contestants can hardly be considered as
fair."); see also Press Release, Russian Presidential Election: For an Election to be Good it Takes
a Good Process, Not Just a Good Election Day, March 3, 2008, availableat http://assembly.coe.
int/ASP/Press/StopPressView. asp?ID=2013 (characterizing the election as a "plebiscite" and
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sheer occurrence of an election, notwithstanding allegations of polling station
improprieties (or worse), is worth noting. Although it might not be entirely
safe to say that the Putin era is over, a sharp line of demarcation was drawn by
this election between that time and whatever follows after.2"' The elections
have deliberately been left to the conclusion of this Article, for reasons that
should become clear.
Right up to the end, the question for many was whether Vladimir Putin was
the least worst practical alternative to lead Russia for the next four years. That
is essentially the same question that was asked a decade ago. On the eve of
the 1996 Russian presidential elections, it was Boris Yeltsin who was
2
considered the least worst practically available leader for Russia."' Much was
forgiven in efforts spent to stave off his defeat at the hands of Gennadii
Zyuganov. °2 This round it is worse, of course, because, in that case, Yeltsin
did not need to risk even the appearance of fiddling with laws that prohibited
his retention of power. The same pathological questions about ends and
means, acceptable election results, and cataclysmic alternative futures had
saturated talk of Putin's future, just as they did Yeltsin's. Six months before
the elections, this pathology had even infected the popular internet site
"YouTube," where people can post homemade videos on the internet. One
might be surprised by how many people devote their time to making funny,
musical, or other types of videos about Vladimir Putin. One that caught the
eye spliced Putin's words together with a tune of a nice reggae beat to depict
him serenading his audience with an answer to a question posed by NTV's
Vladimir Kondratev: "KTo Mor 6si 6brrb npe3HAeHTa? KTO MoXJeT 6rrb.? 5!"

that it repeated "most of the flaws revealed during the Duma elections of December 2007").
200 On April 15, 2008, Putin was unanimously elected chairman of the United Russia political
party, which controls 315 of the 450 seats in the Duma, the lower house of the Russian
Parliament. Sophia Kishkovsky, Putin Agrees to Lead Party, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/15/europe/russia.php; Putin
Electedto Lead UnitedRussia, KOMMERSANT, Apr. 15,2008, availableat http://www.kommers
ant.com/p-12358/r_527/PutinUnitedRussia/. Hours after taking the oath of office, Dmitrii
Medvedev nominated Putin to become Russia's Prime Minister. Medvedev Becomes Russia's
Leader, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7386940.stm. Putin was
confirmed the following day with 392 votes in support of his confirmation. See YrpenHee
naeHapHoe 3ace~aHie roc lyMbi 8 Ma% 2008 rosa, availableat http://www.duma.gov.ru/.
20' See generally MICHAEL MCFAUL, RuSSIA'S 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE END OF
POLARIZED POLITICS (1997); MICHAELMCFAUL, RuSsIA'sUNFINISHEDREVOLuTION: POLITICAL
CHANGE FROM GORBACHEV TO PuTIN 289-304 (2001).
202 HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 306-20.
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("Who might be president? Who? Me!").2 °3 When last viewed, it had already
received over 200,000 hits!2°4
None of this would matter, of course, if Putin's last eight years had not
brought a sense of stability and predictability to most Russians after the
upheavals of the 1990s. Those two characteristics are commonly considered
to be two of the great benefits of the rule of law in a society. According to a
poll by the Levada center this past August, 82% of Russians approved of
Vladimir Putin's leadership.20 5 This is an almost fourteen-fold increase from
his starting point eight Augusts earlier, when only about 6% of Russians could
even say who he was.20 6 There are obvious economic reasons for this
popularity. Putin has presided over the most stable period of economic life
2"7 The stabilization fund
that Russians have experienced since perestroika.
meant to backstop this success is bulging.0 8 It has also been a time, not just
of stability, but of stable economic improvement.20 9 Birth rates, according to
the President, are the highest they have been in fifteen years. 10
203See Video Clip: Putin (YouTube 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ctFr2eOL8

(last viewed June 2, 2008).
204 Id.
205Alexander Osipovich, Putin's 8 Years a Hit with Business, MOSCOW

TIMES,

Aug. 17, 2007.
206 Id. (citing Public Opinion Foundation Poll dated August 18, 1999).
207 Putin himself boasted about reversing capital flight from Russia and the "immense
growth" in Russia's stock market capitalization under his administration. See Response by
Vladimir Putin to KOMMERSANT Correspondent, Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8
Member Countries, June 4, 2007, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/06/04/2149_type
82916 132716.shtml.
201 Catherine Belton, Russia Torn Over How to Invest its Oil Riches, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 18, 2007, at 13 (noting that in the years since 2003, Russia has accumulated $127.5bn
(£92bn, £64bn) in oil revenues in the stabilization fund).
209 David Kramer, Dep. Assis. Sec. of State for Eur. & Eurasian Aff., Remarks to the
Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs: The U.S. and Russia (May 31, 2007), availableat http://
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/85874.htm ("While the latest figures aren't in yet, we know that U.S.
investment in Russia shot up by 50% in 2005. Many of our top companies are increasing their
stake in the Russian Federation, including such mainstays ofour economy as Alcoa, International
Paper, Coca-Cola, GM, Proctor and Gamble, which employs more than 20,000 Russians, and
Boeing, which employs 1,300 and last year signed an $18 billion deal (that's billion, with a "b")
to buy titanium from Russia. And just the other day, Boeing initialed a contract valued at as
much as $2.4 billion with Russian airline S7, Russia's second largest, for the purchase of at
least 15 long-range jets. Many firms that vowed they'd never go back to Russia after the 1998
financial meltdown are damn glad they did -- for the Russian market has been an incredibly
lucrative one in recent years.").
20 lIpaMaA AIHHHa c Ilpe3HArreTom PoccHH (CTeHorpaMMa npAioro Tene- H paatio345pa
Oct. 18, 2007), availableat http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/l0/18/1259_type63 381type
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It is not surprising to anyone that a man with approval ratings that
consistently hover in the upper seventieth percentile should be tempted to
remain in power. But it is shocking to a lawyer's ears to hear the drumbeat and
clamor in the run-up to the election for him to do so by simply ignoring or
quickly amending the provisions of the Russian Constitution; these ideas have
grown from quarters that really should know better. Anatol Lieven has argued
in the FinancialTimes that constitutional amendment is a better option than
simple retirement for Putin and the country."' Norman Stone asked in The
Times, "Why should a successful president be held back by some constitutional
formality?" and answered his own question with the old fallacy from extremes:
"There is no real reason for constitutions to be set in tablets of stone."2" 2
No doubt, that answer is true of any constitution. The Russian
Constitution, barely fifteen years old, is not exactly pre-ordained for
entablature. But it would hardly seem wise to encourage a precedent of
political elites modifying the Constitution and organic statutes to serve their
own short-term preferences to retain their offices.
An implicit theme of this Article has been to emphasize the importance of
institutions over individuals in the establishment of the rule of law; hence the
appropriateness of delaying until the conclusion of this Article a discussion of
some of the political personalities that have driven legal reforms. Although
political scientists generally agree that the rule of law is an indispensable
variable in the consolidation of democracy, they not infrequently search for
indicia of it in the highest echelons of power, most remote from the lives of
everyday people and the legal and judicial institutions that most directly affect
its existence. That is not to say that the selection of a president is unimportant.
But an observer of American presidential elections would be rash to judge the

Mbl Ha6JfuoaeM 3a nociieAHee BpeMA? Ko344HAuHeHT
- caMblH9 BbICOKHR 3a nocneAHHe 15 neT, a Koa3(HiiHrHeHT cMepTHOcTH CaMbilH

82634type146434_148629.shtml ("'T4o
poxcAaeMocT

- C 1999 rosa. CHH3Hnacb H AeTcKaA cMepTHocTi.").
HH3KHHr
211 Anatol Lieven, The Wrong Way for Putin to Retain Influence, FIN. TIMES (London),

Oct. 10, 2007, at 11.
212 Norman Stone, Vladimir Putin Rescued Russiafrom Disaster:So Let's Just Leave Him

Be, TIMES (London), Oct. 4, 2007. See also Ethan S. Burger, Russia Profile Weekly Experts
Panel:PutinForever?,RUSSIAN PROFILE.ORG, Oct. 12,2007, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.
php?pageid=Experts%27+Panel&articleid=a1 192189263 ("The Russian constitution is not a
sacred document. Some will argue that the events between October-December 1993, where a
flawed referendum followed the use of force against the Russian Supreme Soviet, gives the
present constitution an aura of illegitimacy that anyone concerned with the rule of law cannot
help but be troubled by.... If United Russia overwhelmingly controls the State Duma after the
next round of legislative elections, then the constitution should be amended.").
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establishment of the rule of law in the United States by either its odd electoral
system, in which the person who wins the largest percentage of the popular
vote does not necessarily become president, or the legal rumblings that have
followed recent presidential elections. It is to say, however that better
measures of Russia's legal culture are to be found outside high politics, as the
three windows on Russia opened above are intended to suggest. The mundane
is what matters more.
Theories abounded in the months before (and after) the election about how
Putin might retain power. These theories include procedurally clean
amendment of the Constitution that would be retroactively applicable to him,
a bait-and-switch scheme from the position of Prime Minister, retention of
office under some sort of national crisis justification, and even simply seizing
power on the grounds of overwhelming popularity. Putin could have borrowed
a page from the political playbook of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. The first
prime minister of Singapore capped his premiership by creating the post of
Senior Minister upon his transfer of power to his successor, Goh Chok Tong.
After Mr. Goh's transfer of power to a new Prime Minister (always within the
party that has always ruled Singapore, and this time to Lee Kuan Yew's son,
Lee Hsien Loong), Mr. Goh became Senior Minister and another post was
created for then Senior Minister Lee, that of Minister Mentor.2 3 So there is
a template here if the largest country in the world wanted to imitate one of the
smallest. Those who see Prime Minister Putin as pulling the strings of a
puppet-presidency fronted by Medvedev may well believe such an approach
was not entirely rejected.214

213

Founding FatherLee Kuan Yew to Mentor Son's Cabinet, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,

Aug. 10, 2004, availableat http://www.singapore-window.org/sw04/040810al .htm.
214 This Article is not the place to make predictions about the future of Russian legal reform
under President Medvedev. But one of his early speeches is particularly worth noting for its
parallel with an early speech delivered by Putin. When Vladimir Putin was a candidate for
President, he famously asserted that he would preside over a "dictatorship of law." See Vladimir
Putin's Open Letter to Russian Voters, supranote 45. The phrase was pregnant with meaning
and many, including this author, speculated about what it might mean. See Kahn, supranote 72,
at 2; Kahn, supra note 4, at 394. In a speech given a little over two weeks before the
March 2008 presidential elections, then-candidate Medvedev similarly emphasized respect for,
and supremacy of, the law, observing that "I have spoken many times about the sources of a
legal nihilism in our country that remains a distinguishing feature of our society." See Dmitrii
Anatolevich Medvedev, former Russian presidential candidate, Speech at the V Krasnoyarsk
Economic Forum (Feb. 15,2008) (transcript available at http://www.medvedev2008.ru/english_
2008_02_15.htm). His "legal nihilism" speech-and what it foretells about his law reform
agenda-may be parallel to Putin's "dictatorship of law" program.
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Law should stand above power and powerful politicians. It should not only
constrain present office holders, but it should also provide a stable and useful
forecast for what future office holders can expect. One useful rule-of-thumb
for consolidated democracies is that two multi-party, contested elections have
been held resulting in the peaceful turnover of power between competing
political forces.2" 5 The routinization of such a process of electoral change is
crucial.2" 6 A democratic opposition can really only be expected to play a game
it has lost the first time if there are reasonable expectations of achieving power
in the future. Russia is now a far cry from that benchmark, thanks to Putin.
But were Putin to have used the easy option of cancelling constitutional
limitations on his power, that move would have been far worse than statutory
fiddling with electoral thresholds and single-member mandates. It would
signal that the constitution could no longer be trusted to do what it was
designed to do: bind the hands of present office holders who might otherwise
alter institutional rules of the game to augment their own powers. The whole
point of a constitution is to prevent that type of abuse by, in a sense, binding
Ulysses to the mast so he cannot succumb to the Sirens' song.
Therefore, from the point of view of building the rule of law, the counterintuitive answer is that a procedurally legitimate constitutional amendment to
benefit the current office-holder would have been the worst choice. The
reason is that such an approach would advance the notion that constitutional
requirements really should be no more constraining than ordinary statutes. The
rule of law is built by more than that. A constitution should have a "higher
law" foundation. If the 1993 Constitution has been stuck under a cloud by
virtue of the manner of its establishment, then its amendment under current
conditions would work only to darken that cloud.

215 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAvE: DEMOCRATIZATION INTHE LATE TwENTIETH

CENTURY 266-67 (1991) ("One criterion for measuring this [democratic] consolidation is the
two-turnover test. By this test, a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group
that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and
turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn
over power to the winners of a later election. Selecting rulers through elections is the heart of
democracy, and democracy is real only if rulers are willing to give up power as a result of
elections.").
216 Id. at 266 ("Anti-incumbent and antiestablishment responses are the classic democratic
reactions to policy failure and disillusionment. Through elections one set of rulers is removed
from office and another is installed in office, leading to changes if not improvements in
government policy. Democracy is consolidated to the extent these in-system responses become
institutionalized.").
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President Putin left office when his term expired on May 7, 2008. That in
itself is a form of legal reform; few Russian leaders have ever left office of
their own accord, and none who were relatively young, physically able, and
politically very strong. If he desires to be president again in the future, he
should resist the clarion call to interrupt the presidency of his successor. It is
best for the rule of law that Putin make a clean and sharp break from the
presidency, and from the temptation to claim for his premiership duties that
have previously been lodged in the president's portfolio. That would do more
to strengthen the institutions that he is leaving than he can accomplish by
seizing more power. His views may well be colored by fears for his legacy or
his continued influence, or even his safety, and that may lead him to linger in
one capacity or another. How he conducts himself under a new president will
be as important to his legal reform legacy as the work accomplished in his two
terms as president.
Putin' s legacy as someone who supported these legal codes and institutions,
and who paid his dues and judgments to the Council of Europe and its Court,
will be weakened if he stays in command and strengthened if he leaves
President Medvedev the same powers that he enjoyed himself. His legacy has
already been strengthened by leaving at the end of his second term because that
legacy will grow brighter with age. If President Medvedev seeks to pare back
the legal reforms that Putin put in place, he will be the one to explain why he
needs even weaker institutions than his strong predecessor built and then
governed under to so much popular success.
If the answer is that Russia is not ready, that there is no alternative, or that
Putin is well-intentioned in lingering on the basis of unprecedented popular
support, then one must respond by saying that there is indeed a road that is
paved with such good intentions, but it does not lead to the rule of law.

